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ABSTRACT 
This thesis seeks to prove that the Kurds of Iraq possess the legitimate right to 
independent statehood. Investigating the theory of self-determination illuminates the 
relationship between those who struggle for recognition of their rights as a separate entity and 
those who reject the idea, who envision the state as being impermeable. The mod arguments 
examined focus on this relationship; Brilmayer is concerned with the historical relationship of 
territory; Buchanan is more focused on the relationship between the state and the minority 
group* 
Selfdetermination is an important ethical principle. Although valuing liberty and self- 
determination, the liberal tradition generally does not accept the right of self-determination for 
minority groups. Self-determination, an accepted principle in international law, defined in 
Articles l(2) and Article 55 of the United Nations Cha~er, is generally overlooked as a viable 
option for national groups. 
The objective of this thesis is to examine the right of ~e~detennination as it applies to 
the Kurds controlled by the Iraqi state. I will argue that the Kurds in Iraq are an oppressed 
group; that they have a s m g  moral case for secession from the Lraqi state; and that this quest 
for self-determination also receives supporr from fundamental principles 
of international law. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
m o m  nry P-
You wench cnwy the flower 
From the four seasons of my petty 
One of my seasorts will dir. 
m u  take awqy love 
Two of my seasons will dir. 
Ifvou take anqy bread 
Three of my seasons will die. 
And ifyou take away freedom 
All four seasons and I will die. 
by Kurdish poet. Sherko Bekas 
Since the first world war and specifically since the establishment of the United Nations. 
the principle of self-determination has been championed with considerable enthusiasm In the 
past fifty years the world has wimessed several sovereignty changes; formally dependent 
nations have gained independence or have been incorporated into independent states; temtories 
have shifted from one country to another and new stares have been established as the 
consequence of dismemberment of state boundaries. 
Events the world over have motivated international intenst regarding the 
implementation of scEdetcrmination, particularly in unstable regions. Guerrilla warfare. 
internal conflicts, transnational coafrontations and political insuncction are the conventional 
methods by which oppressed national groups have attempted to end the control of the dominant 
power. Although force has often been a substitute for decisive political action. it is the 
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convictions of the oppressed group that inspire the single-minded struggle for self- 
determination. 
?he Middlc East is an ethnically, racially and culturally diverse region. Rather than the 
accepted concept of one race, one language, one religion, the Middle East is composed of 
diverse peoples and cultures. These pockets of diversity are frrquently divided by artificially 
created state boundaries. 
The Kurds of Iraq are a national group. as distinct from the state, who have struggled 
for self-determination. The moral rights of a minority in a state. in which they are a non- 
dominant group, are frequently denied. The rights of nondorninant minority groups are less 
often translated into legal rights as opposed to groups who possess their own state. It is the 
absence of a state that kars a direct correlation to the suffering of the Kurds. 
The Kurds relentlessly strive to remind us that it is they who are the majority in their 
temtory, and are only minorities because their temtory was divided into a number of states. 
The Kurds demand. at least, the right to preserve their identity. The volatile relationships 
between the Kurds and their oppressors results solely from nationalistic feelings and the 
unanswered question of self-determination. 
The Kurds are now identified with the territory of a particular state. The territorial 
boundaries carved out by colonial powers rarely reflect the natural borders of minority identity. 
The boundaries were drawn up administratively and economically and were politically 
convenient for the colonizing power. but these new borders overlooked the interests of the 
Kurds. This division was not merely left to chance; rather it was a calculated manoeuvre on 
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behalf of the colonial powers based on the policy of divide and rule. As a result Kurdish self- 
determination/secessionist issues an threats to the perceived legitimacy of the state. 
Since the incorporation of Kurdish territories into the state of Iraq after Wotid War I, 
Iraqi governments have systematically denied the rights of the Kurds. They have committed 
every kind of oppressive and brutal action known to humans in order to destroy the Kurdish 
identity. One of the most heinous and blatant violations of human rights was the Iraqi use of 
chemical weapons against the Kurds. despite the prohibition of chemical weapons after World 
war I. 
Iraqi governments have justified their intervention in Kurdistan based on the premise of 
the legitimacy of the sovereign state. What is not acknowledged is that the state of Iraq was 
created by a colonial power and that Kurdish territory was annexed and incorporated into Iraq 
by force. The Kurds have never willingly acquiesced to the annexation of theu land Thus, the 
Kurds as an oppressed and at risk group have suuggled for decades to end the control of the 
Iraqi totalitarian regimes and to establish a sovereign territorial state. The Kurdish quest for 
self-determination is justified by both legal and moral principles of secession. 
Even though the Kurds possess all the distinctive components required for self- 
determination. such as culture, language. economy and territory, their cause has been neglected. 
The reasons for this arc two-fold, encompassing both regional and international factors. At the 
regional level the Iraqi state holds to the policy of subjugation and destruction of the Kurdish 
identity, in the international realm there exists a dangerous bias supporting the existing state 
sovereignty system. Furthermore, the Kurds have not been able to defend their cause alone nor 
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have they a supportive state on which they can rely. The unofficial Kurdish national credo, is 
simply, 'The Kurds have no Hends." 
The purpose of this study is to examine and a n a l p  the basis for seIfdetemhation or 
secession in the case of the Kurds. This investigation into the study of scessionist theory 
focuses on both the legal and moral implications of secession. 
I intend to analyze the concept of sewdetermination within the context of legal rights 
by examining secessionist theory. Two predominant theories of the m o d  aspects of self- 
determination will be examined. Allen Buchanan's theory of moral justice for secession and 
Lea Brilmayer's interpretation of territorial legitimacy of self-determination will be reviewed 
and analyzed. 
In chapter three Kurdish origins are discussed in order to demonstrate the distinctive 
Kurdish cultural identity and the legitimate Kurdish claim to temtory, which comprises the 
core argument for many academics and writers who focus on the controversial issue of self- 
determination. 
Chapter four focuses on the historical perspective of Kurdish temtory. This chapter 
provides an historical explanation for the annexation and incorporation of Kurdistan into Iraq. 
Brilmayer's territorial interpretation of secession will be applied to prove the validity of the 
Kurdish claim to Kurdistan. 
In chapter five Buchanan's theory of moral secession is applicd to the Kurds. Within this 
context Iraqi state policy is addressed to demonstrate, with clarity, how the Kurds have 
systematically been denied their rights, proving that the Kurds have a moral right to secede 
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from the tyranny of the totalitarian Iraqi state. In my efforts to prove the case for Kurdish self- 
determination I argue that their claim is legitimate and not a baseless objective. 
hernational laws and principles advocating h u m  rights and selfdctcnnination arc 
discussed in chapter six. As well, the definition of what constitutes the self is cxamirrcd, to 
prove that Kurds arc indeed a nation. In this chapter United Nations' anicles and resolutions 
provide substantial evidence to support the legality of the Kurdish clatn 
M y  rationale for using only the Kurds of Iraq in this case study. and not the other parts 
of Kurdistan. sterns from Britain's control in the region in which independence was promised 
to the village of Mosul. 'RIe fact that I have chosen to discuss only secession for K d s t a n  of 
Iraq in no way negates the legitimate claims to secession by the othu parts of Kurdistan. 
M y  goal in writing this thesis is m clearly. even at times bluntly, demonstrate that both 
moral and legal theories of self-determination prove that the Kurds do possess a legitimate 
claim to establish their own independent state. 
Chapter 2 
Moral Theories of Secession 
Since World War II the world is teeming with secessionist demands. Some of these 
demands have been granted and the old world order of inviolable territorial boundaries has 
come to be questioned with the bnalr-up of the former Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Ethiopia 
and the Soviet U ~ o n  in this chapter I will discuss two of the leading moral arguments for 
justified secession. Allen Buchaaan's Secession, The M a l i 0  QPolitical Divorce from Fort 
Sumrer to Lithuania and Quebec, is considered a benchmark work in secessionist theory and 
Lea B rilmayer's Secession and Self-Detennination: A Territorial Interpretation. an essay often 
quoted by Buchanan in his work presents an interesting territorial dimension to secessionist 
theory. 
I will demonstrate, by examining and later applying these theories to the case of the 
Kurds in Iraq. that their claim to secession is justified in moral theory. Buchanan's criteria for 
secession and Brilmayer's territorial interpretation support the Kurdish quest for justified 
secession. 
Political philosopher Allen Buchanan, in his theoxy of justice. indicates that the world is 
in critical need of an accepted theory of secession.' Currently then is no single comprehensive 
theory of secession universally accepted in schools of political philosophy. The absence of 
secessionist theory leads Buchanan to question why neither a theory has been developed, nor a 
rationale been put forward to explain why secessionist theory is not necessary? Buchanan 
presents a theoretical framework for secession. Within this framework a definition of secession 
is offered, as a desire for a group within an established state to seek sovereign status in order to 
achieve political independence. The political authority of the state is not denied. only the 
authority that the states holds over the secessionist group.' 
Liberal political philosophers, in Buchanan's view, have overlooked the idea of 
secession as a legitimate option for minorities. The liberal tradition, although valuing liberty 
and self-determination generally, ignores the importance of secessionist movements. 
The basic problematic of liberal theory is its aversion to collective rights and deference 
to the rights of the individual. Secession, then, being a group right, is overlooked in liberal 
political thought. By focusing on individual rights, liberal theorists avoided the entire 
secessionist issue. Because no one individual can secede from a sovereign state on hisher own, 
Allen Buchanan. Secession: of f o f i -  . . 




liberals disregard secession as an option. This. Buchanan believes, is faulty logic. Protection of 
group rights encompasses protection of the individual. especially the values individuals find as 
group members.' 
Like the liberals. communitarians overlook secessionist theory in their political thought. 
Buchanan assens that communitarian philosophy, or any political philosophy which places 
value on the collective, must look at the boundaries of communities and the rights of groups to 
self-determination. By not acknowledging. within certain specific situations. that secession is 
justified and legitimate. these political philosophies have fallen short of a comprehensive 
ideology.' 
Secession is an important, timely issue deserving of its place within a theoretical 
framework. Buchanan states that the particular theoretical structure is not as significant as the 
acknowledgement of the concept within a political philosophy, whether it be nonideal or ideal 
theory. 
Nonided normative theory which "deals with principles suitable for situations in which 
compliance will not be perfe~t,"~ allows for the concept of secession. Buchanan recommends 
that political philosophy establish an ideal theory in which the principles of legitimate secession 
would be incorporated. "Ideal theory is the articulation and defense of principles of justice for a 
society in which these principles are fully implemented.'" 
4 Ibid p.8-9. 
Ibid. pp.4-5. 
ti Ibid. p.6 
' Bid. p.6. 
Ideal theory overlooks secession, yet justifies revolution and civil disobedience. 
Buchanan claims that secession should not k nlegated to only nonideal theory; he suggests 
that ideal theory investigate secession. The same p~ciples  that apply to revolution and civil 
disobediena, in cases w h e ~  the state is either unjust or violates the rights of the people, could 
be applied to legitimate secession. 
The main goal of secessionists. as opposed to revolutionaries, is not to overthrow the 
govemment in power, but to detach themselves from the authority of the existing government, 
by redrawing the state boundaries. The acceptance of revolution as a justified claim to 
overthrow the authority of the state indicates that secession should be accepted as well. If the 
state situation is so unsatisfactory as to warrant overthrowing the government, then an 
equivalent situation should allow for a portion of the population to detach themselves from the 
unjust authority? 
Buchanan presents several arguments to justify secession. Within these arguments 
Buchanan illustrates how secession in certain specific circumstances is legitimate. Once a moral 
right to secede has been established, two principles apply: (1) "...it is morally pennissable for 
those who have this right to secede, and (2) that others are morally obligated not to intefere 
with their ~eceding."~ 
Buchanan acknowledges that the association between moral and legal rights is 
complicated. He proposes that in certain situations the strength of the moral right to secession 
should be suppod by international law. Moral rights pertinent to this thesis include, 
Protecting fiber@, Ekcaping Disctiimnato~y RedistributionD Preserving CulturesD Serf-&$erne 
and Rectifiing Pdnjustices.  
According to Buchanan this argument centres on liberty and its accepted limits. The 
Harm Principle is introduced stating that it is "impermissible to interfere with an individual as 
long as her choice does not harm others."" Buchanan defines the harm, in this particular 
context, to mean the violation of a right He extrapolates fiom this idea to say that if it is 
wrong to interfere with an individuals' right then it is equally wrong to intcrfen with a groups' 
right to secede, if there is no harm intended for others. The responsibility to prove harm is 
placed upon the antisecessionists to demonstrate that the harm incurred is so serious as to 
warrant the exercise of force against the  secessionist^.^^ 
A basic tenet of liberal theory is that the state should safeguard the rights of the 
individual such as, M o r n  of expression, the right to participate in the political process and 
the equality of opportunity. When the state maintains these values, groups can thrive within the 
state; however, when these values are denied groups may choose to detach themselves fiom the 
existing state. They would be justified in this action as long as no harm is perpetrated against 
lo bid. p.29. 
Ibid. p.30. 
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the state. Buchanan claims. "Seen in this way, the right to secede is the logical extension of a 
principle of toleration thought to be cenoal to the liberal point of view."" Where rights are 
denied, such as tk right to emigrate. then groups may have no other choice but to opt for 
secession from the existing state in order to pursue freedoms and political independence. The 
great concern with this argument is that unjust governments who pmue the policy of non- 
emigration are likely to prevent secession by any means at their disposal. The strength of the 
groups claim to secession is greatly enhanced when the state denies the right to emigration. The 
normal course for unjust or totalitarian states prohibits the right of people to emigrate to other 
states, thereby secession may be the only option to security of life." 
In accordance with the Harm Principle the right to secede does not include 
appropriating temtory or resources to which the separating group never possessed any 
legitimate claim. In this case the act of secession would harm the people of the existing state, 
thereby rendering the secession morally unjustifiable." 
This argument focuses on unfair taxation practices, inequitable government regulated 
programs or biased economic policies of the existing government Rights need not be violated 
or denied: discriminatory redistribution done justifies secession. Buchanan defines 
discriminatory redistribution as programs and polities that, "systematically work to the 
disadvantage of some groups, while benefiting others, in morally arbitrary ways."" 
A familiar and serious charge against ethnic groups who control the governments of 
'Ihird World countries is that unfair distribution of wealth is dhcted toward people of their 
own ethnicity. Economic development is also geared toward the ngion controlled by the 
dominant ethnic group, leaving the minority group with little oppoRunity for advancement 
Discriminatory redistribution is often linked to violations of other rights. but not always so. 
When coupled with other infringements of rights, discriminatory redistribution is a clear and 
significant grievance against the existing government. l6 
It is not a violation of individual, group or state rights, Buchanan asserts, to engage in 
practices of discriminatory redistribution; rather it is a breach of the "social contract" 
Governments that operate to benefit only a portion of their citizens and exploit others lose their 
legitimate authority, ergo discriminatory redistribution presents a valid argument for 
secession. " 
Failurc to implement fair economic redistribution programs, "in effect voids the state's 
claim to the territory in which the victims reside, whereas the fact that they have no other 
recourse to avoid this fundamental injustice gives them a valid title to it? Discriminatory 
redistribution provides legitimate grounds for temtorial claims for the secessionist group, "... 
Ibid. p.40. 
l6 Ibid pp.41-42. 
l7 bid. pp.43-44. 
l8 Ibid. pp.44-45. 
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there an cases in which the state's persistence in the injustice of discriminatory ndistribution, 
together with the lack of alternatives to secession for remedying it, generates a valid claim to 
territory on the part of the secessionists."" The states lawful claim to territory is dependent 
upon its policies of just economic practices and egalitarian treatment of all ~ i t i z z n s . ~  
Buchanan lists five criteria that must bc met by a nation which chooses to secede from 
the state based upon Preserving Cultures? The criteria include: an endangered culture; other 
means of cultural preservation must be unavailable or inadequate; the culture must maintain an 
acceptable level of justice; secession of the group must not n s d t  in an iIliberaI state, and no 
other state or third party can have a legal claim to the seceding territory.* 
Those who argue for secession based on Preserving Culture must demonstrate that there 
is a justifiable right to preserve the specific culture and that this right leads to a legitimate 
moral basis for secession.= Buchanan believes that because any individual who belongs to a 
cultural group can frrely choose to associate with another cultural group, "...then is. strictly 
speaking, no right to the perpetual existence of any one particular culture."" 
l9 Ibid p.45. 
'O Ibid. pp.41-45. 
*' Ibid. The argument for Pnsewing Cultures runs from pages 52 to 64, in 
Buchanants book. Only the infomation relevant to this thesis has been detailed. 
* Ibid p.61. 
* Ibid p.54. 
Ibid. p.55. 
For the argument for Reserving Culturcs to be valid, it must be proven that the only 
way to adequately protect and pnsewe the culture is for the p u p  to posscss or obtain 
temtory. In the case where the group has no previous historical claim to &tory, Buchman1s 
argument states that it. "...does not begin with a preexisting claim to temtory. Instead, its 
conclusion includes such a claim." No special claim to temtory is required. The group may 
be in such need for protection that temtory would be awarded to them. A cultural groups valid 
claim to territory does not necessarily legitimize secession from the state based on the 
Preserving Cultures argument. 
Any such principle would be unacceptable for at least two reasons. Fist, it treats 
valid temtory claims too lightly, according them too little substance. Second, 
because the notion of a culture and hence of a cultural group is so expansive and 
vague, the principle is a recipe for intolerable excessive international 
instability." 
The Preserving Cultures argument, does not presuppose that the cultural group 
possesses a legitimate, historical claim to the seceding temtory. For a sufficient and acceptable 
argument the group must show that a third party has no genuine right to the territory in 
question. Buchanan contends that only infkquently does the necessity to preserve cultures 
satisfactorily support secessi~n.~ 
" Ibid. p.56. 
" Ibid. p.60. 
" Ibid. p.64. 
Ihe Self-Defense argument states that a national group is entitled to protect itself 
against a lethal Uucat. Justified secession within the parameters of the selfdefense principle is 
so compelling that Buchanaa advances the argument drat a group's necessity for self-defense 
can induce a claim to temtory that voids the claim of the state that previously he16 legitimate 
title." 
Whatever moral title to the seceding temtory the aggressor state previously held 
is invalidated by the gross injustice of its genocidal efforts. Or. at the very least, 
we can say that whatever legitimate claims to the seceding &tory it has are 
outweighed by the claims of its innocent victims. We think of the aggressors 
right, in the former case, as dissolving in the acid of his own inequities. and, in 
the latter, as being pushed down in the scales of the balance by the greater mass 
of victim's right of self-defense? 
Buchanan perceives the moral right to selfdefense as paramount to property rights. In 
the case of a self-defense argument to justify secession, Buchanan asserts that seEdefense of an 
endangered group takes precedence over ownership of temtory. 'lhe group in need of 
protection would be entitled to land over which they formally had no legitimate claim 
It would be a mistake to assume that this type of case is fanciful simply because 
it is hypothetical. One of the strongest arguments for recognizing a Kurdish state 
or an Armenian state may be that only this status. with the territorial sovemignty 
it includes, will ensure the survival of these peoples in the face of genocidal 
threats. So there can be and indeed are situations in which the right of self- 
defense grounds a right to secede." 
- - - - - - - - - 
* Ibid. p.65. 
'9 Ibid. p.65. 
' Ibid. p.67. 
The act of unjust incorporation of a region into a larger unit qualifies as legitimate 
grounds for secession. according to thc p ~ c i p l e  of Rectifying Past Injustices. The segment of 
the population who wish to secede may reside on land that was directly annexed by the existing 
state or the tcmtory may have been unjustly acquind by the former state. the predecessor of the 
current state. This principle of moral secession focuses on the concept of reappropriation of 
territory by the legitimate owner of stolen land?' 
The basis for this argument is so strong that many scholars argue that any claim for 
secession must be established on this moral principle. Buchman refers to this argument as the 
"historical grievance version of the territoriality thesis." which contends that every bid for 
legitimate secession must be based on a provable right to territory?* 
Buchanan states that while the historical grievance thesis is a valid argument to support 
secession, he differs fiom other academics who believe that an historical claim to temtory is 
the only legitimate secessionist principle. As in the argument for secession based on the self- 
defense hypothesis, aggressor states lose title to temtory as a result of their genocidal 
tendencies against subnational or ethnic pups .  The land in question becomes the autonomous 
temtory of the persecuted secessionist group.u 
To acknowledge that there is. in certain circumstances. a legitimate moral right to 
secession indicates that the group should not be prevented from seceding. There aze some 
'' bid. p.67. 
32 bid. p.68. 
" Bid. p.69. 
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justifications favouring secession that are so compelling that incerferenct would be immoral. 
Reasons that in other cam may vindicate interference. that wodd seem to benefit the current 
state system. are not substantial enough to balance the scales of injustice and immorality of the 
aggressor state. Thus. Buchanan contends that secessionist groups who conclusively 
demonsoate their irrefutable case ought to have the unrestricted right to control their own 
destiniesY 
International law cannot be completely depended upon to absolutely ensure the right to 
secession. Lea Brilmayer states, 
... the principle of self-determination of peoples suggests that every "people" has 
a right to its own nation-state. While the positive law status of this norm and its 
applicability to the secessionist context are debatable, on a rhetorical level few 
deny the principle's appeal. Unfortunately, it seems directly contrary to another, 
equally venerable, principle of international law, which upholds the territorial 
integrity of existing states?' 
Brilmayer believes that, above all other issues related to the secessionist claim, the 
legitimate foundation of the claim must be based on a temtorial conflict Rather than an active 
dispute between rights of people and temtorial claims, the two principles work together to 
compose a valid claim for the separatist group, with the claim to territory being the core of the 
argument." 
The distinct culture argument does not, in Brilmayefs belief, represent a valid case for 
secession; without a claim to territory the argument is illegitimate. International law cenaes on 
the distinctiveness of the oppressed group, overlooking the importance of a valid claim to land. 
Brilmayer contends that the crux of the argument is not bilateral. between the distinct people 
and the state, rather it is a trilateral relationship combined of people. state and temtoqcn 
Lea Brilmaytr. "Secession and Self-Determination: A Temtorial 
Interpretation." Yal  vol. 16, no. 1. Jan. 199 1 
pp. 17% 178. 
" Ibid. p. 178. 
37 Ibid. p. 179. 
Secessionist groups f'requently rely on United Nation's principles which achowledge 
the right to selfdctctmination. So much emphasis is placed on these principles that the fact that 
these precepts do not overpower the present statcts territorial integrity is often overlooked. 
Great importance is attached to the right of self-detennination, the drawback Wig that 
secession qualified only by the right to self4etermination could potentially lead to 
destabilization of the world order. BriImayer contends that restrictions must be placed on the 
right of self-determination to avoid the possibility of anarchy. An argument is presented 
differentiating between a nation or a people and minority groups, stating that secession is 
always inappropriate for minority groups. The argument focuses on defining a group either as a 
nation or a people. 
Brilmayer fbrther contends that the right to secession would be legitimate only for those 
groups under alien control. This argument is dependent upon whether the people in question 
fonn a genuine nation. The main criteria for this definition include a distinct race, language, 
religion or ethnicity from the state's dominant group.Y 
The debate over the validity of particular claims to secede is thus framed in 
terms of the two generally recognized values of self-determination and territorial 
integrity ... The appeal of a secessionist argument lies in the importance of self- 
determination, the links between that principle and the concept of democratic 
~e~govemment, and the alleged moral superiority of self-determination over 
the preservation of amtorial boundaries. Ethnic distinctiveness plays an 
important role in these arguments because the secessionist needs to limit the 
number of groups entitled to claim a right to secede." 
The historical acceptance of disagreement between the arguments for secession based 
on rights of self-determination and secession founded on territorial claim is misleading. 
Temtorid sovereignty provides a more legitimate claim for secession than the right of people 
in the self-determination argument The concept of temtorial sovereignty does not permit the 
state to maintain control over territory, for which they do not possess legitimate ownership? 
If secessionists argue that the cumnt exercizt of temtorial power is illegitimate. 
and that territorial sovereignty in fact belongs to the minority group rather than 
to the majority, then the secessionists can base a right to secedt upon a temtorial 
claim, rather than on a personalistic one. In other words, tacit consent can be 
attributed to a state's inhabitant's only when the state has legitimate power over 
its territory." 
Territorial demands, asserted by secessionist groups that they have a valid claim to a 
specific territory exists; however, these claims must be based on solid grounds and the 
importance should be achowledged in international law. Like Buchanan. Brilmayer states that 
secessionist temtorial claims based on historic grievance are more striking and self-evident4' 
Two historic grievance arguments are presented to support separatist group demands. 
The fxst argument entails a group's desire to secede from state conquered territories. In this 
case it is appropriate to assign blame with the aggressor state being the antagonist. The second 
argument focuses on third party violations against h e  secessionist group. Colonializing powers. 
in the past, manipulated ethnic boundaries to suit their own needs. The drawing of the 
boundaries rarely reflected the interests of the ethnic groups. 
The current result of the cavalier and unrealistic drawing of boundaries has lead to 
serious disputes between the dominant and separatist groups. The fallout of the colonial 
- - - - - - - - - - 
Ibid. pp.186-187. 
bid. p. 187. 
42 Ibid. p. 189. 
powers' interference is ztflcctcd in secessionist movements and groups who stand firm in theu 
beliefs to regain their territory and establish sovereign statehood? 
... one major defect of the standard account of seWdctcrmination namely its 
insufficient focus on the histoey of the dispute. A secessionist claim based on 
nothing other than the rights of existing peoples to have their own nations would 
concentrate on the issue of whether an identifiable group constituted a people, 
and whether the group was subject to alien subjugation ... So static a view of the 
division of a society into peoples cannot N l y  capture an important normative 
f e a m  of separatists' demands, namely that the asserted historical grievance 
confers on it the right to a particular tenitory. The standard account neglects the 
fact that separatists typically seek to right historical wrongseu 
An important element included in the historical grievance argument involves 
establishing the degree of acceptable temtorial change in order to cornct the injustice incurred 
by the secessionist group. This predicament is referred to as "adverse possession." The problem 
is a result of uncertainty in regards to maintaining the status quo and comcting the past 
injustice.'' 
One factor useful in reaching a resolution examines the continuance of the territorial 
claim, kept alive by the secessionist group. Where claims have been kept active adverse 
possession is not a consideration, due to the fact that the separatist group has never conceded 
the disputed land to the dominant group. Groups who cannot keep a temtorial claim alive 
because of repressive methods used against them are seriously disadvantaged. The lack of 
opportunity to actively and openly work toward secession should not detract from their 
justifiable cause. 
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A second issue pertinent to adverse possession centres around population transfers of 
citizens loyal to the dominant state to areas populated by the secessionist group. This strategy 
implemented by the state, minimizes the sangth of the secessionist claim in the eyes of the 
world Population transfers validate the state's claim to the disputed turitory. Thereforc strong 
resistance is evident, on behalf of the secessionist groups, who see their claim to temtory 
weakened." 
All separatist movements are valid only when they possess a legitimate claim to specific 
temtory. The group must be able to demonstrate why they should own this piece of land. 
Archetypal political philosophy divides ~e~deterrnination as a reason for secession against 
territorial claims. Brihayer contends that a fully grasped comprehension of territorial integrity 
would embrace the principle of self-determination. Secession disputes always focus on the 
quest for independent territory." 
Chapter 3 
Kurdish Background 
My intention in this chapter is to examine the relationship of the Kurds to the temtory 
in question and to investigate the history of the disputed land. The origins and culture of the 
Kurds must be discussed to establish their historical claim to temtory and their distinct culturaI 
status. I propose to lay the groundwork for the application of Buchanan's and Brilmayets 
secessionist arguments. This chapter demonstrates that the Kurds are a unique group, separate 
from the dominant group in the state of Iraq* The evidence will forcefully prove that the Kurds 
indeed possess the qualities and characteristics of a nation. 
I will discuss the land that the Kurds occupy because that is an important element in 
Buchanan's case for rectifying past injustice and Brilmayer's temtorial theory. In order to 
effectively apply these arguments it is imperative to establish that the land is Kurdish. A 
discussion on Kurdish natural resources is an essential application to Buchanan's discriminatory 
redistribution argument All these elements are imponant in assessing the legitimate Kurdish 
claim for a moral right to secession. 
adeins 
The compound proper noun, Kurdistan is actually composed of two words. The fmt 
phonetic fonn, "Kurd," carries the ethnological connotation of the people who populate the area 
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and the second lexical representation "istan," reveals a territorial suffix meaning "the land of." 
Kurdistan, therefore, is defied as, "the land of the ~ u r d s . " ~  
The earliest records indicating the existence of mountain tribes in the Z a p s  e o n  
were found in the historical =cords of the Greeks and Sumtrians dating from 2 5 0 0 ~ ~  to 
2000~~. These rccords referred to the Kurtis, Guri. and the Kardohki (Kardo) tribes." 
In the ancient world the Kurds played a prominent role by establishing thne 
kingdoms: Lullu, Guitium, and U r w .  In addition, they established two 
empires, the Kassite and the Hurri-Marani. As a matter of fact, for most of the 
second millennium BC, the Kassites and the Hurri-Mitani were the leading 
powers controlling Mesopotamia and the Zaps highlands? 
Historical documents indicate that Assyrian King Tiglath-Pileser I, fought a tribe of 
wild mountain men known as the Kur-ti-e in 1 100~d'. Accounts of the Athenian soldier- 
adventurer Xenophones' tormented retreat from Persia to the Black Sea, 400-401~~  written in 
a Mustafa A1 Karadaghi. -. vol. 1, no. 1, (Kurdish Human 
Rights Watch, U.S.A., 1992.) p.66. 
'' There is agreement, albeit to varying degnes, among the following scholars 
and writers that these tribes were the precursors of the present day Kurds. For 
more information on the origins of the Kurds see... 
(1) A1 Karadaghi. ibid. p.54. (2) Qanaty Kurdo (Kurdoiev). 
(Baghdad: Centre for Kurdish 
Studies, 1973). p.43-50. This book is written in Kurdish. I take responsibility for 
the translation of the title and text. (3) Hassan A h h  . a . . 
. . Shldv.oronto: Oxford University Ress, 1966) p.3. (4) Borhancdin A. Yassin. m~ of m Pthewbfthe 1941 - 
le4L (Lund: Lund University Press, 1995) p.35. 
so Mustafa A1 Karadaghi. Kurdish W a  (Fairfax: Kurdish 
Human Rights Watch, 1995). p.3-4. 
the AraahLs (mcaning go inland or "upcountry") mounts a clash with the hostile Kardu. 
Xcnophone describes the Kardu as an heroic people unwilling to submit to foleip rule.* 
Diffc~tnt opinions prevail =garding the ancient origins of the Kurds. Tbe renowned and 
prolific Kudologist, Qanaty Kurdo, argues that the Kurds art the indigenous inhabitants of 
Kutdistan. They arc not of Iranian origin, as some miters bclicvc. nor have they any link to 
the Arabs or Turks. The Kurds comprise an amalgamation of tribes and nations ... rS 
While scholars dispute the origins of the K d  prior to the retreat of 
Xenophone's Ten Thousand, writers seem to have reached a consensus that the 
Kurds wen indeed the fierce tribe who attacked the Greek troops. Research 
lending evidence to this contention include: (1) Stephen C. Pelletiett. 
.westview Press: Boulder, 1984) p.21; 
(2) Phillip G. Kreycnbrotk & Stefen Sped (eds.) w e .  
(Routkdge: New York. 1992) p.10; (3) Sa'ad Jawad. - 
1970. (Ithaca Pnss: London. 1981) p. 1; (4) Abdul Rahman Ghassemlou. 
theKurds. (Collet's: Lon on, 1965) p.35; (5) FinIty Hmpcr. . 
m.('Wayne State Press: Detroit, 1978) p.358. 
" Kurdo. pp.43-44. 
Rashid Yasemty. the M a n  writer, links the Kurds to Persian origins. Arabic 
writas. such as Tabari and Masoudi endow the Kurds with an Arabic heritage. 
while the Turks continue to dwell in a state of denial. refusing to recognize the 
existence of the Kurds, rrferring to the Kurds in Turkey as 'Mountain Turks." 
Debate among schola~ continues: 
(1) PeUetierc. pp.20-21 claim that tht Kurds an the descendants of Iranian tribes 
immigrating to the Zagros Mountains; (2) Afh. pp. 2-3. traces the KWs to 
Iberians moving into Kurdish regions from Asia Minor. (3) David McDowell. 
7he. (Minority Rights: London. 1992) p. 11, states that the Kurds an a mix 
of immigrating Indo-European tribes and indigenous peoples; (4) Yassin. p.35, 
concurs with McDowell's hypothesis; (5) According to Ghassemlou. pp.66-67, a 
commission sent to Mosul. by the League of Nations in 1924. to settle boundary 
disputes between Turkey and England concluded that, The Kurds are neither 
Arab. Turks nor Persians. though they are most nearly related to the Persians. 
They an different and clearly distinguishable from the Turks, and still more 
different and remote fiom the Arabs." 
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Many credible soutccs argue that the Kurds arc an ancient comrunal group. associated 
with the Mcdes, who inhabited the mountainous Z a p s  region of present day ~mdictan.~ 
Over the course of time the Medes becam an agglomeration of hdo-European tribes located in 
h e  Zips  bigbhds. The Medes upon immigration to the ngion encomezed an established 
tribal pcoplc, the ancient K d s ,  when they fim ingrtssed the eastan Zagros. The Kurds 
aligned with the Mcdes, in approximattly 700BC. in order to retaliate against Assyrian 
aggression? 
From 7 0 0 ~ ~  to 550Bc the Medes were the controlling force of the Zagros region. at this 
time the language of the Kurds, an ancient Caucasian vernacular, evolved into a dialect of the 
Indo-European Median t ~ n g u e . ~  
~ ~ n r m a e t  
The present-day Kurdish language is a derivative of an early Indo-European lanpage, 
related to Persian, Afghan and ~aj ik? The language of the Kurds, although related to a dialect 
of western Iranic is, etymologically. a distinct language.* The Kurdish language. spoken in 
isolated mountains areas, urban centres and aU points between has developed dialectical and 
CJ. Edmonds. Kuids.. (Arabs.ord University Press: Toronto, 
1957). p.7. 
" For a more detailed discussion on the Medes/Kurci relationship see Al 
KaradaghL-, vol. 1. no. 1. pp.35-57, also Ghassemlou. pp.34-35. 
For brief discussions on the Median origins of the Kurdish lanpage see A1 
Karadaghi, -. vol. 1. no. 1. p.57, also Edmonds. p.7. 
Ghassemlou. p.26 also Yassin. p.36. 
Yassin. p.36. 
regional idiosynaasies. Two main dialects have been established: Sorani and Kurmanji, as well 
as three minor dialects: Hawfami or Gorani, Garmiyani or Luri and ZaZa. however the 
speakers of this dialect prefa to caU it ~ i r n l i . ~  Forthc purposes of this thesis only those 
dialects spoken in Kurdistan of Iraq will k discussed. 
The Gnat Zab river acts as a linguistic boundary for the dialectical differences of 
Kurdistan of hq. Sorani (sometimes nfemd to as Kurdi), considered the primary dialect of 
the Kurdish language. is spoken mainly in the central region. Kurdish literature is written in 
Somni and w h e ~  Kurdish is taught in public schools, it is the Sorani dialect that students learn. 
The Kurds from the north and west of the Great Zab communicate in the Kurmanji dialect. 
Residents of the narrow strip of Kurdish territory south-east of Sulaymania and in small 
pockets east of Mosul speak the Hawrami dialect. G d y a n i  or Luri is spoken in the small 
district in southern part of Kurdistan, on the border of kin." 
Writers often allege that a single Kurdish language is a myth perpetuated by a band of 
desperate rebels grasping at ragged straws to substantiate a weak claim to nationhood. One 
writer states. "...the Kurds have failed to adopt a lingua f h c a .  This has not only hindered 
inter-Kurdish communication it has also reduced the importance of language as a symbol of 
ethnic identity for the ~urds."" This charge is refuted by other writers who assert that the 
" A1 Karadaghi. -, vol. 1, no.2, p.87. 
A1 Karadaghi. -. vol.1, no.2, pp. 87-89.. also Yassin. p.36. 
Ahmed Ferhadi. @of . . 
(University of Michigan: Ann Arbor. 1990), pp.23-24. 
N&r Entessar.  (Lynne Rienner Publishers: 
Boulder, 1992) p.4. 
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single Kurdish language represents and confirms an unequivocal Kurdish identity.62 Rofessor 
of Near Eastern Languages at New York University. Dr. Ahmcd Fcrhadi, states that "mutual 
intelligibility between any two speakers of Sorani and Kumranji is usually possible with some 
adjustments on both s i d ~ s . " ~  
Kurdish script is based on a modified Arabic alphabet, as is the Persian and was the pre- 
Kemalist Turkic script. The Kurds of lrag added characters to the Arabic alphabet to represent 
sounds inherent to the Kurdish language. The Kurds in Iraq have Latinized their script, not 
physically, but in that each individual sound is represented by a single character.@ 
" Kreyenbroek, P.G. "On the Kurdish Language." in Phillip G. Knyenbroek 
& Sperl, Stefen.(eds.) -: O v e .  (Routledge: New 
York, 1992) pp.68-70.76-78. Yassin. p.36. 
It is the belief of this thesis writer that authors often contend that Kurdish dialects 
are so disparate as to be unrelated languages. This contention, on their part, is 
inaccurate. It is true that the Kurdish language enjoys rich dialectical diversity. 
however clear communication between dialectically different groups is an 
everyday occurrence. This claim is supported by A.R. Ghassemlou. "...in spite of 
certain differences between K d  ( S o d )  and Kermanji, it is quite easy for the 
Kurds fhm the north-western and south-eastern areas to understand one another." 
Ghassedou. ibid p.28. 
" Ahmed Ferhadi.~. 21. 
" A1 Karadaghi. -. vol. 1, no.2. p.102. 
Writers fiequtntly remark that "Kurdish has no script of its own." see Sa'ad 
Jawad. p. l., also Phillip 0. Kreyenbrock. p.77. 
Although Kurdish script is based on the Arabic alphabet. it has over the centuries, 
evolved into a distinctly Kurdish alphabet. This is to say that no Arab could read 
Kurdish without study nor could a Kurd read Arabic without an equivalent 
amount of effort. To say that Kurdish script is Arabic is to say that anyone who 
can read English can also read Swedish. 
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The Kurdish language predates the Persian language, reportedly by three hundred years. 
This is supported by the discovcsy of the Zend Avesta, the ~ligious book of the ancient 
Kurdish religion Zoroastrianism in about 8 0 0 ~ ~ ~  
Until the seventh century, the Kurds were either pagans, who participated in tree and 
solar cults or followers of ~oroaseianism.' Zoroastrianism was initially practised by the 
Medes, the Kurds absorbed this religion into their belief system approximately in 8 0 0 ~ ~ .  
Zoroastrianism is the oldest and first monotheistic religion." An offshoot of this religion is 
practised today in Kurdistan of Iraq by the Yezidi, who worship the god of evil.' 
At the time of the Arab conquests, seventh century AD. the Kurds fought against the 
forced practice of Islam. EventuaIly, the Kurds submitted to the Arab armies and Islam became 
the dominant religion of the ~ U r d s . ~  The overwhelming majority (approximately two-thirds) 
of Kurds in Iraq are of the Sunni persuasion, who follow the Shafaii school. There is a lesser 
population of Kurds who belong to the Shi'ite sect. Religious minorities include Christians, 
" Al Karadaghi. - vol. 1. n0.2, p.98. 
" Minority Rights Group. A  . . 
(Minority Rights Group: Britain, 199 1) p.9. 
" Al  Karadaghi. -. vol. 1,110.2, p.65. 
' Minority Rights Group. p. 10. 
The Yazidi worship their god of evil because they believe that this god will win 
out over the god of good. They hope to mollify his malice by worship. See Al 
KaradaghL-, vol. 1, no. 2, p.65. 
" Yassin. p.38. 
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Jews and Yazidis. There is little religious dissention in Kurdistan of Iraq. The pndominately 
Sunni Muslim Kurds enjoy friendly relations with the Shi'itc Muslim community and all other 
religious rninotitics.'" 
There is a lack of general consensus among writers ngarding the Kurdish populations 
within the confiies of Iraq. Although the governments of Iraq have acknowledged the Kurds as 
a separate ethnic group, it has never been in the governments best interests to provide the world 
with an accurate number. Population numbers are deliberately reduced as a strategy to 
rnisreport the tme s ize  of the Kurdish population and a Kurdish claim to territory. Fewer Kurds 
in Iraq simply equates to a weaker case for secession. 
Ambization of Kurdistan also affects population statistics. Arabs from Iraq are moved 
by the government into Kurdish anas, while Kurds are forcibly relocated to Arab sections of 
~raq." The numbers presented here are estimates gathered by different authors. According to 
Ismet Sheriff Vanly. the Kurdish population in Iraq in 1975 was three million? David 
" Howell. W.N. Jr. A of N&nal . .(University of Virginia, 1965) pp.75-79. 
" Committee Against Repression and for Democratic Rights in Irag 
(CARDRI). (Zed Books: London. 1989), 
p. 198. 
Gerard Chaliand. A Peo& Without-. 
(Olive Branch Press: New York, 1993). p. 143. 
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McDowell approximates the Kurds at four million. one hundred thousand in 1991." In 1990 
Borhanedin A. Yassin counted the Kurds at four million, four hundred thousand." 
It is highly unlikely that any of these numbers arc completely accurate due to a high 
incidence of war, Arabization and deportation, flight of refugees and questionable government 
statistics. 
Rior to the twentieth century Kurdish societal organization was governed by a tribal 
system Nomadism. an early way of life for Kurds. is virtually non-existent today." Early in 
this century industrialization and urbanization caused the nibal o r b  to teeter on the brink of 
extinction: however the values associated with the Kurdish tribal consciousness still exist today. 
Kurdish tribes are based on an hierarchical organization in which 
The largest unit is the ashiret. moz] a confederation of tribes over which a 
paramount chief may preside. The ashiret is made up of tira. whose members 
descend from a common patrilineal ancestor. The tira, in turn. is composed of 
the khel, collections of households living as a village or camping together. We1 
members also descend from a common patrilineal ancestor, and that ancestor is a 
descendant of the tira founding father." 
Tribes are not completely composed of members related by blood. In fact "...then wen many 
cases where the tribesmen rallied around a religious chief (shailch or sayyid) who was not one 
" Yassin. p.37. 
" Minority Rights Group. p.11. 
76 James John Coyle. . . . (George Washington 
University: Washington, 1993). p.79. 
"Hoz" is the Kurdish !ranslation for the Arabic word "ashiret" used in the quote. 
of their kin, and identified thcmtelvu as a tribe." Lift-long membership in a spcciflc tribe is 
not mandatory. Members do smr allegiances with one tribe in otdu to negotiate membership 
in another tribe. Tribe members may leave or form a new oibc for reasons of war, famine, 
inadequate water supplies or arable landa 
Ibm ate two distinct subgroups in the Kmdish oik. The permanent p u p  is 
composed of m m k r s  who have dirtct blood tics with the ruling family. The floating element 
is made up of people who, depending on the circumstances, may leave a panicular group and 
join with anotherow 
Rather than a kinship group, the tribe is a political or territorial p u p .  The a@ (tribal 
chieftain) the political leader of the arhiret may control several villages. The agha posses~es 
sole power over the tribe. He acts as the leader of the tribal warriors, the diplomat, and chief 
administrator (including tax collector) of all tribal business. The agha never sullies his hands 
with physical labour. The survival of the tribe depends on the sangth of the agha. The ugha's 
word is law? 
Disputes were common between tribes. Conflict usually arose over territorial 
ownership, economic resources and political self-intenst This fiiction among the tribal chiefs 
led to feuds among the hostile tribes. Hostilities be tween tribes zesultcd in disunity and a fragile 
Othman Ali. & i $ i & l  . 
(University of Toronto: Toronto. 1992). p. 13. 
McDoweIl. pp.20-22. 
Ali. p.17. 
harmony, easily disrupted by m n  a small tmsgnssion. This unstable situation allowed for 
state interference in tribal affairs. Govenunents made full use of the conflict between battling 
tribes, by pitting one faction against the other? 
"For map makers - if not for international lawyers - then is such a place as ~urdistan."" 
The territorial integrity of Kurdistan represents a clear defence for the Kurdish claim to 
secession. The region refemd to as Kurdistan of Iraq has definite boundaries, separating it 
from Arab Iraq. 
Southern Kurdistan is a geographical term used by the Kurdologists to refer to 
the Kurdish region of 'Iraq in the north. The area corresponds roughly to the old 
Ottoman wilayah of Mosul. It is bounded on the north and north-east by three 
international frontiers-those of Syria in the Jadra, Turkey within the southern 
end of Taurus, and Iran where the frontier generally runs with the crest of the 
main ridge of the Zagros. The internal administrative boundary with the former 
wilayah of Baghdad is formed in the south-east by the Sirwan river and on the 
south-west by JabaI Hamrin, a low mountain ridge of about five hundred feet 
above the and by a straight up and westward across the Jazira back to the 
Syrian frontier? 
Kurdistan of Iraq is divided into the following provinces: Erbil, Suleimanieh. Dehok, 
Mosd and KirMc; Kirkuk and Mosul an not included in the autonomous region. Other 
" Gerard ChaIiand. p. 17. 
The discussion of Kurdish tribal society offered in this thesis is an 
overview of the topic, for more indepth information see, Othman Ali, 
pp. 13-19 and McDowell, pp. 18-23. 
" Pelletien. p. 14. 
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provinces an partidy located within Kurdistan. such as Kut or Wasit and ~ i y a l a . ~  The 
Kurdish cities of Khanaqin, Mandali and Sinjat st i l l  maintain prtdominately K d s h  
populations in spite of the state attempts at ~rabization.~ The boundaries of Southern 
Kurdistan demarcate this territory b m  the rest of Iraq. 
Minotitits 
The Kurds constitute the overwhelming majority population in Southern Kurdistan; 
however there src ethnic and religious minorities. As with the population numbers for the 
Kurds, accurate numbers for ethnic minorities itre impossible to obtain. The Turcornan 
population resides mainly within the provinces of Kirkuk and Erbil, in the towns of Talafer and 
Shikan. These people an the descendants of Turks who occupied Southern Kurdistan during 
the reign of the Ottoman Empire. They fom 2-396 of Iraq's total population.'l Due to the 
Ambization of Kurdistan. the Arab minority in the region has grown considerably. n e y  
occupy area surrounding the Erbil province and the territory west of Mosul, near the Syrian 
border." 
Several Christian sects. Assyrians, Chaldeans, Armenians. are scattered throughout 
Kurdistan. Assyrians are mainly located in the province of Dahok Ethnic and religious groups 
" Phebe Marr. of m. (Westview Pnss: Boulder, 1985). 
pp.9-10. Kieyenbmek & Sped. p.40. 
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nsiding in Kurdistan of Iraq, have been reduced in number due to wars. mass deportation. 
massacres and refugee flight." 
Riot to the cnation of the state of Israel, Southern Kurdistan included a numerically 
insignificant Jewish population. The Jewish population today is practically non-existent? 
Today the territory of Southern Kurdistan is populated predominantly by Kurds. Ihe 
population of minority groups has been reduced over time. "A result is that Kurdistan has 
become more homogenous and that a nation state based on Kurdish ethnicity has become at 
least con~eivablc."~~ 
Kurdistan enjoys a favourable climate sufficient for agriculture. Generally speaking, 
Kurdistan is an agrarian society. Rich mineral deposits and oil production provide Kurdistan 
with potential for great economic expansion. As a single unit, Southern Kurdistan possesses 
abundant economic resources to successfully establish a separate territory. 
Signifcant oil deposits located in Kirkuk, Ain Zda. Zanboor. Khaniqin and Koysinjaq. 
provide Southern Kurdistan with one of its most valuable resources. Statistics fiom 1961 
indicate that in Southern Kurdistan oil production was estimated at 80% of Iraqk total oil 
production, in 1975 the production of oil from Kurdistan of hq was estimated at 75% of the 
- - -  - - - - - - - - - 
Knyenbroek & Sperl. pp. 38-40. 
" Kreyenbroek & Sperl. p.39. 
90 Kreyenbroek & Sperl. p.40. 
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total. Oil extracted from Kurdish oil fields provided the state of Iraq with revenues of 7,178 
billion." 
Kurdistan of Iraq is frepuently thought of as a mountainous region; in actuality 
mountains constitute only 25% of the total land mass. M e l d  snow from the mountains, as well 
as considerable rainfall provide moisture for the soil of the fertile plains and vallcys. The banks 
of the Tigris river and its tributaries the Greater and Lesser Zab rivers offer rich soil ideal for 
rice, grains, vegetables. fmits and tobacco. Livestock grazes in the pastures of both the plains 
and mo~ntains.~ 
Large quantities of minerals such as copper, iron, lead, silver, sulphur, coal. zinc. tin 
and magnesium are found throughout Southern Kurdistan, the= are also large quantities of 
marble and alabaster? The huge profits accumulated by the state has done little to improve the 
lives of the Kurdish people from whom it is taken. 
The evidence provided in this chapter establishes the Kurdish historical claim to 
territory as well as proving. beyond a doubt, that the Kurds are a nation without a recognized 
state of their om.  The issues presented in this chapter provide a basis for the application of 
moral theory to confm the legitimate case for an independent Kurdistan. 
* F. David Andrews. of f (Documentary 
Publications: Salisbury N.C., 1982). p. 19. 
Mustafa Al Karadaghi. The Kurdish Nation," 110.3 
(Kurdistan T k s :  Fairfax, December 1993). pp.44-45. 
Chapter 4 
The Kurdish Claim to Territory: An Historical Perspective 
The historical background of Kurdish territory is relevant to Brilmayer's territorial 
argument for secession. It is also an important clement in Buchanan's Rectifuing Part Injustices 
argument because only the Kurds of Iraq have a legitimate historical claim to this land. 
Therefore it is necessary to examine the historical relationship of the Kurds to the territory in 
question, and the ethics of its present day incorporation into the state of Iraq. 
c
Within decades of the Ottoman victory over the S e w  Empire, (circa 1 4 0 0 ~ ~ ) ~  the 
Ottomans controlled essentially aIl  of Asia west of Persia, northern Africa and Morocco. The 
empire absorbed most of the Islamic frontier. Powerful and avaricious, the Ottoman sultan 
became the self-appointed caliph, the legatee of Prophet Mohammed, who acted as the leader 
of Islam The Ottoman sultans, exercized total authority in simultaneous dual roles as both the 
worldly and religious ruler of a great empire peopled by heterogenous groups of native 
inhabitants? During the era of Ottoman rule present-day Iraq was divided into three vilayets, 
" Dana Adams Schmidt. Journev. (Little Brown: Toronto. 
1964). pp 47. 
95 Yo& Shiebaj Gotlieb. -ves of Deve- 
. (Clark University. 
Worcester Mass. 1992). pp. 174- 175. 
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erovinces) Basra, Baghdad and M o d .  The overseers of the vilayeu wen appointed by the 
sultan, who ruled the territory according to the wishes of the sultan. The authority of the sultan 
was weakened by his distance from outlying tcnitorics." 
In the early lSOO's, after much solicitation by both the Persians and the Turks, the Kurds 
became cognizant of their own political power within that dynamic, as the player between the 
incessantly warring empires. In 15 14 the Kurds sided with the Turks to fight the Persians in the 
Perso-Ottoman battIe of Tchddyran. Afler a victory for the Turks, to which the Kurds 
contributed, the grateful sultan agreed to recognize the sixteen independent principalities of 
Kurdistan. Kurdish princes were given complete frcedom to rule over their principalities as 
they chose. The Kurdish princes answered to no one. They did not pay taxes or tributes to the 
Ottoman Empire. In return for the k d o m  extended to them by the T ~ k s ,  the Kurds were 
required to pledge loyalty to the Sublime Pone and to maintain the boundaries of individual 
principalities." 
This was system maintained until the nineteenth cennuy. At this time of great stability 
and independence. referred to as the "Kurdish cultural renaissance," Kurdish literatue, culture 
and civilization developed and flourished. Kurdish artists and scientists were protected and 
encouraged. Even at this time of advancement and cultural growth, however, the Kurdish 
princes were unable to unite and build a unified Kurdistan. As men of honour, the princes had 
no legitimate nason to break the agreement made with the Turks. As committed Muslims, it 
% Gotlieb. ibid. p. 177. 
" Chaliand. p. 14. 
AEra. p. 16. 
Yassin. p.42. 
Adam Schmidt. p.48. 
was unthinkable to oppose the sultan-caliph. as long as the agreement was intact, for to do that 
would be to offend the Umma (Islamic community)? 
The inability of Kurdish principalities to merge strengthened the already powerful tribal 
mentality and ideology. The tribal consciousness is the antithesis to the development of a 
national identity. Ottoman sultans and superior officers played tribal divisions into their favour. 
Any t h a t  that the Kurds may potentially pose as a single unit was, in effect, obliterated by 
their tribal  division^.^ 
Turkish intervention into Kurdish affairs in the early nineteenth century resulted in over 
fifty uprisings against the Ottoman Empire in this century. As the Sublime Portes' influence in 
Europe waned, it looked to Kurdistan to renew its supply of troops and revenue. Kurdistan had 
been used as a battlefield during the Russo-Turkish (1828-30) and the Turko-Persian (1877-78) 
wars. The Turks were threatening the independence and sovereignty of the Kurdish princes. 
demanding that tributes be paid in order to ease the Ottoman's financial problems. In 
consequence, the Kurds became frustrated with Turkish financial and military interference and 
as a result rebelled against the empire. The object of the insurrections was to establish an 
independent ~urdistan.'~" 
Several important Kurdish revolts occurred in the 1800's partly as a reaction to 
the increasing taint of Turkish nationalism in Ottoman policy. While local in 
* Gotlieb. pp.272-279. 
Qlaliand. pp. 15- 17. 
of the (Nor& Texas State University: Denton Texas, 1983). 
p.82. 
origin and tribally-based, these uprisings. the two most important of which w e n  
lead by Bedir-Khan of Bohtan and Sheikh hidullah of Shamdinan, 
demonstrated steady propss toward the articulation of Kurdish nationaIisdo1 
Atmnpts by the Kurds to create an independent state wen unsucassful. The Kmls 
could not win against the powerful army of the Turks. The Turks. under the leadership of 
AbduUlamid II, endeavoured to integrate and assimilate the Kurds, (early 1890's) implementing 
a Pan-Islamic appeal the Turks offered to share power with the aghas. Many Kurds acquiesced 
as a means of swival.  Overall this tactic to end Kurdish revolts was s~ccessful . '~ 
The Ottomans entend World War I. fighting against the Allies; their empire on the 
verge of ruin. Again the Turks applied the contemptible strategy of the Pan-Islamic appeal. 
The Turks called their Muslim brothers to arms by declaring a jihad (holy war) against the 
Allies. Many Kurds heeded the call while others refused to fight with the Turks. The Kurds 
sustained heavy casualties fighting for the ~ttornans.'~ 
Due to the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the strong nationalistic fcelings that 
w e n  developing among the Kurds, the Kurds saw the opportunity for the creation of an 
independent Kurdistan. Kurdish leaders sought support from Russia The Kurdish leader 
Abdurrazaq Bedir Khan, in 1916. presented an arrangement to the Russians in which the Kurds 
lo' Howell. p. 129. 
lrn Gotlieb. pp. 282-283. 
Chaliand. pp.24-26. 




would unite with the Russian armies and in return the Russian would assist the Kurds in 
establishing an independent Kurdistan. The Russians did agree to collaborate with the Kruds 
and an independent state was promised. Obviously. the independent state was never achieved. 
Speculation exists as to why the Russians backed away from the agreement; perhaps it was the 
realization that such a manoeuvre on their part would be ~ s i s t e d  by the Ottomaas. Persians and 
~ermans. '~  Other writers suggest that their lack of cooperation was a result of their hidden 
agenda which was to annex Kurdistan into the Russian ~rnpire.'* 
Some Kurds. rather than fight for the Turks, fought with Russia, embracing the hope 
perpetuated by the Czarist government who declared that World War I would usher in national 
independence for ~urclistan.'" This Russian propaganda was yet but another manipulation of 
the Kurds to increase their own efforts of colonization and conquest "By the end of the First 
World War, Russian forces attacked Kurdistan from Iran .... The Kurds wen massacred by the 
~ u s s i a n s . " ~ ~  
The 19 17 October Revolution motivated the Russian departure from World War I. The 
withdrawal created a power vacuum for Great Britain which enabled them to implement their 
post-war strategies of rrgional domination and dismemberment of the Ottoman ~rnpire.'~ 
'" Yassin. pp.47-48. 
Khosrowshahi. p.86. 
lo' Chaliand. p.30. 
'06 Chaliand. pp.29-30. 
Khosmwshahi. pp. 86-87. 
'" Khosrowshahi. p.86. 
The main objective of the British during the nineteenth century was to create a buffet 
zone between the borders of the British Eastern Empire and Russia Consequently, the S y b  
Picot Agreement (March 9,1916) between the Fieach and the British was aimed at dismantling 
and partitioning the Ottoman Empire for themselves. The agreement stated that the vilayet of 
Mosul would be placed under a French mandate. Britain would maintain its interests in 
Mesopotamia fiee from any potential Russian interference. The Russians were allotted most of 
the Kurdish territories; however when Russia withdrew from the war and the Soviet state was 
established, there was no longer a Russian intenst in the 
Originally, the British did not have complete agreement among themselves on how to 
resolve the Kurdish issue. Some British officials supported Kurdish independence, while others 
were opposed. However, after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire mar consensus was 
reached. in that the foremost British mission was to secure as much territory from the deposed 
empire as possible. The British wanted to ensure that the former Ottoman power in the region 
would never be revived. In order to fu l f i  their objectives the British needed the friendship. if 
possible, of the Kurds: if not that at least not open h~stility."~ The British established a 
propaganda campaign focusing on the theme that Turks are oppressors, British are liberators. 
Therefore, a fksh plan for Mesopotamia was to be drawn up. and the British 
authorities embarked on a campaign to occupy Southern Kurdistan. The territory 
to the north of 'Iraq had difficult tcnain inhabited by warlike tribes men, and the 
'09 Ali. pp.89-90. 
Howell. p. 139. 
'lo Yassin. p.48. 
size of the British armed force in Mesopotamia did not allow for a major 
allocation of troops in operations in the north. Therefore, it was clear that the 
Kurds could not be subdued by brute force. For this muon an intensive 
propaganda campaign to win over the Kurds was necessary.'ll 
The propaganda campaign pmved to be highly successfbl for the British. On October 
23,191 8 the British moved toward northern Iraq to capture Kirkuk. By the end of 19 18 the 
British completely controlled Sou them ~urdir  tan."' 
The liberation movement in Kurdistan of Iraq developed rapidly in 1918 and 19 19. 
Kurds of the Sulaymania area declared Kurdish independence. The British approved of their 
leader Mahmud Barzinji becoming governor of the region. The British used Baninji to contain 
potential Turkish aggression and to keep the Arabs in line. Shaikh Mahmud was sincerely 
concerned with the plight of the Kurds and was the driving force behind the secessionist 
movement. He quickly fell out with the British once he realized that he was little more than a 
powerless figurehead. Intense struggles between the British and the Kurds eventually resulted 
in the determining bade in which Shaikh Mahmud was injured and taken prisoner by the 
British. He was sentenced to death. The sentence was reduced to life in prison. The Shaikh was 
exiled to India. This fmt important insurrection was the precursor for years of near-continuous 
revolts against the British from all strata of Kurdish society. 1'
Ali. pp.93. 1 1 1- 1 12. 
'I3 Ghassedou. p.63-64. 
Ali. pp. 1 19- 13 1. 
The end of World War I and the deterioration of the Ottoman Empin pmvided the 
Kurds with a signXcant opportunity to gain independence. Articles 62.63 a d  64 of the S e m s  
Treaty granted autonomy to the Kurds within the Ottoman Empire. Contingent upon a 
referendum by the Kurds lull independence was to follow one year latctl" 
Article 62: A Commission sitting at Constantinople and composed of t h e  
members appointed by the British. French and Italian Governments respecdully 
shall draft within six months fkom the coming into force of the pnsent Treaty, a 
scheme of local autonomy for the predominately Kurdish areas lying east of the 
Euphrates, south of the southern boundary of Armenia as it may be herrafter 
determined. and north of the frontier of Turkey with Syria and Mesopotamia. as 
defined in article 27. Il(2) and (3) if unanimity cannot be secured on any 
question. it will be referred by the members of the commission to their 
respective Governments. The scheme shall contain full save guards for the 
protection of the Assyro-Cbaldeans and other racial and rtligious minorities 
within these areas. and with this object a commission composed of British. 
French, Italian. Persian and Kurdish representatives shall visit the spot to 
examine and decide what ramifications. if any should be made in the Turkish 
frontier. where. under the provisions of the present Treaty, that frontier 
coincides with that of Persia. 
Article 63: The Turkish government hereby agrees to accept and execute the 
decisions of both the commissions mentioned in article 62 within three months 
from their communication to the said government 
Article 64: If. within one year fkom the coming into force of the prescnt Treaty 
the Kurdish people within the areas defined in article 62 shaU address 
themselves to the council of the League of Nations in such a manner as to show 
that a majority of the population of these areas d e s k  independence from 
Turkey, and if the council them considers that these people an capable of such 
independence and recommends that it should be granted to them. T d c y  henby 
agrees to execute such a ncommendation and to renounce aII rights and title 
over these areas. 
The detailed provisions for such renunciation will form the subject of a separate 
agnement between the principal Allied powers and Turkey. 
"' Yassin. pp. 48-49. 
If and when such renunciation takes place no objection will be raised by the 
principal AUied powers to the voluntary adhesion to such an independent 
Kurdish state of the Kurds inhabiting that part of Kurdistan which has hitherto 
been included in the Mosul vilayet!' 
This treaty. while benefiting the K i d s  nsiding in Kurdistan of Iraq, on the whole was 
insulting and degrading to all Kurds. According to this treaty Kurdistan was limited to only the 
vilayet of Mosul as an independent entity. 
The terms in the Treaty of Sevres regarding the creation of an independent Kurdish state 
never came to fruition. One reason for the subversion of the treaty was the strength of Mustafa 
Kemal Ataturk nationalist movement in Turkey. He captured Kurdish territory and claimed it in 
the name of Turkey. His efforts interfered with ratification of the provisions of the treaty. The 
potency of his movement forced the omission of the Kurds in the Treaty of Lausanne, which 
replaced the Treaty of Sews in 1923. The discovery of oil in the Kurdish vilayet of Mosul 
diminished British support for the Kurds. The British chose to protect their interests and back 
the Iraqi Arabs and the Kurds w e n  forgotten. The plight of the Kurds seemed an 
inconsequential matter in comparison to the developing relations of Kemal Ataturk with the 
Russians. In order to maintain goodwill with the Turks and minimize the Russian threat, the 
British serving their self-interests, disregarded promises made for an independent Kurdish 
state. l6 
""oyle. pp. 150- 15 1. 
lL6 Yassin. pp.49-SO. 
Chaliand. pp.33-35. 
The i&a of a Kurdish state was met with disapproval by the High Commissioner, Percy 
Con Cox agreed with his pdccessor Amold Wilson that the Kurds were not prepared to 
establish and maintain their own state."' 
?he King of Syria Faisal. was deposed by the French as they implemented full colonial 
rule. Faisal, f?om the Hashimite family of Mecca, was then installed by the British as King of 
Iraq on August 23,1921. This appointment did little to enhance Kurdish-British relations. As 
hostility and resentment gnw amongst the Kurds. the British, in order to sustain their influence. 
xecded Shaikh Mahmud from India On September 14,1922 the Shaikh was declared King of 
Kurdistan. At this time, the British design of Kurdistan was composed solely of Sulaymania 
province. Mahrnud's objective was to liberate al l  of Kurdistan. Rotection of the rich oil 
deposits in the Kirkuk region were the motivating force behind the R.A.F. &-raids and British 
occupation of Sulaymania until it was liberated once again June 11.1923.'" 
C.J. Edmonds, Political Advisor in Mosul and Advisor to the Ministry of the Interior 
Iraq, 1935-1945 expressed his views regarding Kurdish nationalism. It is safe to say that the 
following views are representative of the British at the time of Kurdish demand for self- 
government. 
I am not an enthusiast[ic] Kurdish nationalis t.. they are hateful people and if 
Iraq's government was likely to be strong enough I should say to hell with their 
Kurdish nationalism As it is. and in view of the desirability of trying to keep the 
Turks out as long as possible I regard Sulaimani as a slippery fish that must be 
patiently played till we land him in the 'Iraqi basketu9 
Shaikh Mahmud's nationalistic movement suffered a series of setbacks. Sulaymania was 
permanently lost to the Kurdish July 19. 1924.1m 
It seems clear that the British never had any serious commitment in allowing rhe Kurds 
to establish a sovereign state. Their overwhelming objective was to czcate a client state that 
contained rich oil deposits. 
The states of the Middle East (Iraq, SynWa, Lebanon and Jordan, etc.) were not 
mated out of the struggles of bourgeois or revolutionary vanguards. On the 
contrary, they were set up by British and French imperialism. to sewe their own 
ends and in accordance with their own immediate needs. If Anglo-French 
imperialism had required an independent Kurdistan they would have set one up, 
of their own accord since the Kurdish leadership was at about the same stage of 
underdevelopment as its equivalent in many Arab c~untries.'~' 
Signed on July 24, 1923. the Treaty of Lausanne carved up Kurdistan into four separate 
regions. This treaty confined the Kurds to a life of oppression. which they have rebelled against 
ever since. Although the Kurds were uninvited, to the Treaty meetings, the British and the 
Turks presented themselves as their representatives. 
This treaty focused on the territory of Mosul and the oil therein. The French had the 
rights to Mosul. and were unaware of the rich oil deposits. They were convinced by Lloyd 
George to sumnder their rights to the territory in exchange for Celicia Later when the French 
learned they had been duped by the British. they received a 25% share of oil profits, at current 
market value. 
'" Ghassemlou. p.66. 
12' Chaliand. p.3 1. 
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The Americans believed that their interests were not being met. After a bitter press 
campaign and arduous negotiations they rcceived a 20% share in Turkish Petroleum 
Interestingly. this is the same company that held exclusive rights to the Mosul and 
Mesopotamian oil fields. Even more interesting, the head of the British delegation at the 
Lausanne Confenme, Lord C w o n  was the main shareholder in that company. 
The Turks, who knew of the oil in Mosul, contested any claim the British made to the 
temtory. The British and the Turks wen unable to agree on who should acquire Mosul and 
both sides were forced to wait for a decision made by the LRague of Nations. On June 25,1926 
MosuI province became part of Iraq, under a British mandate. This treaty did not mention the 
Kurds and they were granted no national rightsiP 
The British had envisioned incorporation of Southern Kurdistm into Iraq. From their 
occupation of these territories until their departue in 1932 the British made every effort to 
secure the success of the newly established Iraqi state. After a long. brutal and suppressive 
occupation the British were successful in absorbing Kurdish territories into hq; brushing aside 
the demands and suffering of the Kurds who aspired to foxm their own independent state. 
Chaliand. p.49-50. 
Adams Schmidt. p.54. 
Kurdish Territorial Claim for Secession 
Application of Brilmayer's Territorial Interpretation of Secession 
As has been previously discussed in BriImayer's explanation of territorial-based right to 
secession, certain criteria must be met by the secessionist group in order to qualify for such a 
claim. This section will prove that the Kurds of Iraq do meet her standards for legitimate 
secession. The Kurds, by anyone's definition are a distinct people - a nation - and do suffer 
under alien subjugation. Kurdish tenitorial claims are based on historical grievance and today, 
because of Arabization and other oppressive state policies the Kurdish right to secession grows 
even stronger. 
The Kurds and the Arabs are distinct races. The Kurdish language is Indo-Ewopean and 
not Semitic. Kurdish origins and language are strictly ~ u r d i s h . ' ~  Although the Kurds and the 
Arabs are Muslim. there are differences in their religious rites. Kurds are Shafii Sunni, while 
Arabs arc predominately Shi'ite and Hanafi Sunni." By aU defitions the Kurds are a distinct 
people who form a separate nation from the Arabs? 
'" See chapter 3. pages 23-30 for infomution on origins. language and 
religion. 
'" Asti Suhrkc & Lela Gamer Noble. & . 
-. (Pracger Publishers: New York, 1977). p.69. 
Brilmayer states in her article "Secession and Self-Determination: A 
Territorial Interpretation," that self-determination and territorial claims are inter- 
dated. In order for a claim to temtory to be legitimate the secessionist group 
The Kurds constitute a single nation which had occupied its present habitat for at 
least thne thousand years. They have outlived the rise and fall of many imperial 
races: Assyrians, Persians. Greeks. Romans, Arabs, Mongols, Turks. They have 
theu own history, language and culture. Their country has k n  unjustly 
partitioned. But they are the original owners, not strangen to k tolerated as 
minorities with limited concessions granted at the whim of the usurpers.'" 
The British made a gift of Kdstan to thc Iraqis. Unfortunately, the British did not 
own Kurdistvl and the Kurds wen not consulted on the transaction, thenfort the British gave 
away temtory to which they never had any legitirnate ownership. The process from the 
beginning was invalid. The Iraqi state itself is a pure invention of the ~ r i t i s h . ' ~  The state of 
Iraq is a mockery because it incorporates territory to which it never had any legitimate right1= 
This was a marriage forced upon the Kurdish population of Mosul [vilayet] by 
the British and confirmed by the League of Nations, absolutely without the 
consent of the Kurdish people, who have fought against it, and tried to get out of 
it, for the last seventy-two yeusela 
The Kurds do possess legitimate cause to secede from kaq from the historic grievance 
perspective. Britain gained control over Basra and Baghdad (the Arab areas of Iraq) and then 
must prove that they are a nation and not a minority group, to which claims to 
tenitory never apply. She lists race, language, religion and ethnic distinctiveness 
as her criteria for nationhood. p. 1 83. 
CJ. Edmonds. "Kurdish Nationalism,'' J o u r n a l l -  
HiSorJr. vol.6, no.1, (1971), p.88. 
" Kendal Nezan. "Time for Britain to Repay Its Debt to the Kurdish People." 
-. (London, 30 August 1990). 
l" Brilmayer discusses illegitimate ownership of minority temtory by the 
state, see page 20 of this thesis. Illegitimate ownership by the state nsults in a 
valid argument for secessionist groups. See thesis pages 42-48 for information on 
the annexation of Kurdistan into Iraq. 
HabiboUah Atarodi. "The Kurds: A Nation of 30 Million Denied its . C Freedom," J urnal. vol. 16, no.3, (Fall 
1991), p. 277. 
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moved north to aanex Kurdish tcmtorics by force, after World War I KunlictM was forced to 
become part of the newly created state of kaq by the British The unnatural boundaries of Iraq 
w e e  drawn to include K d t a n  witbin a predominately Arab state. The Kurds, who had 
maintained their cultme for centuries, were expccttd to assimilate into the newly established 
state m g d t s s  of cultural, ethnic and linguistic differences and the legitimacy of their own 
The modern nation-state of Iraq had been an artificial creation of the Jkague of 
Nations in the 1920's. when the former southern vilayet Eurdistan of Iraq] of 
the Ottoman Empire was subdivided into mandate temtories administered by 
Britain and France. Iraq's boundaries. incorporating the vilayct of Mosul. 
reflected British interest in achieving control over that region's known oil 
resources."' 
Reference to the Sevres Treaty confirms that Southern Kurdistan murdistan of Iraq) 
was to be granted independence within a year of acceptance of the treaty. At that time the 
Kurds of Iraq must demonstrate their desire to establish an independent stare. The chief British 
official in Baghdad, at that time. Arnold Wilson, conceded that four out of five Kurds residing 
in Southern Kurdistan favoured independence. The opportunity for the Kurds to officially 
demonstrate their preference for independence never took 
" Brilmayer presents two grounds for her historic grievance argument, see 
pages 189-190 of her essay. For the purposes of this thesis I have discussed only 
the second argument; manipulation by colonial powers. which applies to the 
Kurdish people. 
13' Middle East Watch. "Genocide in Iraq," Middle Wa-. 
(Human Rights Watch: New Yo&. July 1993). p.32. 
'j2 Kendal Nezan. "Time for Britain...". 
Adverse possession or the reparation of injustice through territorial change favouring 
the secessionist group. pertains to the Kurdish claim to secession to a lesser degree.'* 
Although then are clear boundaries separating Kdstan from the remaining areas of hqt 
Maps often indicate demarcation between the two territories. To deny the existence of 
Kurdistan is fallacy. The Kurds have never willingly acquiesced their land to any outside 
group. They have relentlessly battled to keep their claim for an independent Kurdistaa alive. 
Therefore. in this case, the argument for adverse possession does not apply. The Kurds. the 
Arabs and the rest of the world know. Kurdistan exists. Therefore to completely redefine the 
borders of Kurdistan of Iraq is unnecessary. 
Adverse possession is a valid argument when the policies of the Iraqi regime are applied 
against the Kurds. Iraqi state policy has worked to reduce the territory of the Kurds. The 
province of Kirkuk. historically a Kurdish region. was in 1974 excluded from the Kurdish 
autonomous rrgion declared by the Iraqi government The Kurds claimed that the oil fields 
surrounding Kirkuk were in every way Kurdish and should be left in ~urdistan.'~ The Iraqis 
disagreed, consequently the Iraqi version of an autonomous region was established without the 
consent of the Kurds. 
... The Kurds had reason to believe that Saddam Hussein was delaying a fmal 
agreement in the hope that the Kurds would lose their international 
protection .... Yet those details that did emerge indicted that the number of 
sticking points were increasing rather than decreasing. Baghdad would not 
accept Kirkuk as the capital of autonomous Kurdistan ... 135 
I33 For Brilmayer's discussion on adverse possession, see page 199 of her 
article. 
Khosrowshahi. p. 150. 
Af'r the 1991 Gulf War and the mation of the Allied "safe haven" large sections of 
Kurdish territory were excluded. These anas are rich in oil and mineral deposits and now iidl 
under Iraqi jurisdiction. For this nsson adverse possession does apply to the Kurdish 
secessionist movement The Iraqi state would make every effort, as is historically proven. to 
steal and plunder Kurdish land. thereby reducing Kurdish territorial integrity and denying 
Kurds their richest and most productive territory. 
A peripheral issues related to adverse possession consists of population transfers. in 
which loyal citizens of the dominant reghe an relocated to minority group anas. The 
secessionist group may believe that this group of people should have no influence whatsoever 
on their claim; however "as a practical matter, the new setdea tend to legitimize the temtorial 
status quo."'" 
The Iraqi government methodically engages in the policy of Ambization of Kurdistan, 
again this plan is implemented to minimize Kurdish territorial integrity. The Iraqi government's 
objective is to transfer Kurdish populations to Arab cities and Arab populations to Kurdistan. 
nese transfers mainly occur in strategically significant districts. surrounding military and 
economic areas. in order to safe guard Iraqi control over the Kurds. These practices ate outlined 
in a dispatch to the Arab Heads of States from the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan. 
1) Eviction of thousands of Kurdish peasant and workers' families from their 
villages and towns to places in the south of Iraq. 2) Confiscation of the lands and 
possasions of the people by force. 3) Setting Arab tribes in the homes of evicted 
Kurds. 4) The txansfer of most Kurdish civil sewants. soldiers. and police to the 
south of Iraq. 5) The transfer of Arab civil servants to K d s t a n  with promotion 
and generous allowances. 6) Ending teaching in the Kurdish language by schools 
in Kurdistan. 7) Emptying Sulaimaniya Univcsity of Kurdish personnel. 
'" Brilmayer. p.200. 
8) Changing the Kurdish names of villages and towns in Kurdistan. 9) Neglect 
of Kdistan as ngards industrial and civil projects. 10) Subjecting the evicted 
Kurds to bad social conditions~The Kurds lay claim only to Kurdistan and no 
other temmr y. "' 
The Kurds lay claim only to Kurdistan and no other territory. They have always 
regarded their tMitory as land stolen by the British and Iraq. Their historical grievance is based 
on legitimate claim to territory, since this land has been considered Kurdistan h m  a time 
beyond recorded history, only since 1925 has it been considered Kurdistan of Iraq. 
The Kurdish nation has remained intact despite efforts by external forces to crush them 
into nonexistence. Their national identity and legitimate claim to territory combined with 
international laws of self-determination: according to Brilmayer's interpretation of secessionist 
thought, equate to a valid right to secede from the tyrannical state of Iraq. 
The unity of Kurdistan is an undisputed reality. The Kurds are Kurds in every way, 
because of their common culture, language, traditions, and temtory. They have refused to 
become assimilated, dismissed or objectified by external manipulation. They have been 
deprived of their human rights. but refuse to be deprived of their land. Kurdistan. as the Kurds 
know too well, will never be relinquished. 
I" Khosrowshahi. p. 1%- 1%. 
Chapter 5 
Policies of Injustice 
In this chapter Iraqi state policy will be examined as relevant to human rights 
violations, cultural destruction, economic discrimination, tenitorid appropriation and genocide. 
The discussion will focus on Buchanan's moral theory of justice. The application of this theory 
to Iraqi state policy will prove that the Kurds do possess a valid moral claim to secession. 
Buchanan's case, in Protecting Liberw, conveys that acceptance of the liberal conviction 
that it is morally unjust to interfere with an individuals right implies that it is equally immoral 
to interfen with a p u p s  right, even if the groups goal is secession. This case applies to 
individuals and groups only if their intentions do not harm others.lY 
Iraqi authoritarian regimes have resorted to methods of deprivation of political and 
cultural rights. The rights of the Kurds to be active partners with the Iraqis in the political 
process of the state have k e n  denied. Even though. at times, the government has tried to 
See pages 10-1 1 of this thesis and pages 29-32 of Buchanan's book for 
more information on the argument for Protecting Liberty. 
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Kurdish participation in the political pmcess within the cumnt state boundaries is 
acceptable, so long as they obey every state rule, law and regulation, no matter how unjust. 
Once any reference is made to promote their national group intaests. then. their participation in 
governmental pnxxsses collides with state political ideology and is silenced. 
The tbne main points of contention between the state govemmcnt and the Kurds are: 1) 
the Kurdish right to exercise political control over the intcmal affairs of thek own region and 
communities; 2) the ability to control and benefit from the development of the region's 
resources; 3) the M o m  to protect and promote their own culture and 
Just three days prior to the Kran-Iraq War, on September 19,1980. elections were held 
to select representatives to the Kurdish Legislative Council. The event, at first blush, appeared 
historically momentous; for the first time the Kurds voted for their own delegates to the 
assembly. A closer look into the elections prove them to be a farce, the Iraqi government holds 
f m  contkl over the military, political and economic resources. furthermore the list of 
nominees was drafted and approved by the Iraqi regime. The election was nothing more than a 
ploy to gain Kurdish support for the approaching war with Iran. 
Two years later, a Kurd. Taba Muhyadeen Ma'aruf, was appointed vice-president of 
Iraq. He was appointed to this post shonly after the fust popular Kurdish uprising. His position 
was devoid of any real power. He was the "token Kurd" and his duties were merely superficial, 
13' Ted Robert Gum & Barbara Harff. Ethnic C w  W@ . . 
&d&.(Westview Press: Boulder. 1994). p.98. 
at best ceremoniaL He was given this position to placate the Kurds and to foaify ambivalent 
world 
According to ArticIe 7 of the Ba'ath Party Pladorm 
The Arab world constitutes that part of the glok inhabited by the Arab nation, 
which stretches fiom the T a m  Mountains (Iraqi-Turkish border). the Pusht-i 
Kuh Mountains (Iraqi-Iranian border). the Gulf of Basra (it. the Arab Gulf). the 
Arab Occan, the Ethiopian Mountains. the Sahara, the Atlantic Ocean and the 
~editenanean. "l 
Clearly the Iraqis include Kurdistan within their state, the Ba'ath party constitution has no 
policy to deal with minority issues of any kind. The party strategy is to absorb minorities into 
the Arab pop~lation."~ There is no room within Iraqi political thought for preservation or 
maintenance of minority cultures within state boundaries. The Iraqi objective is to perpetuate 
and safeguard Arab nationalism, not to protect the liberty of the Kurds. 
Arabs from other countries senling in Iraq are not to be considered "fonigners," rather 
they are accepted as Iraqi citizen. This is known as Iraqi Law 36 and was enacted in 1961.1U 
The policy that applies to Arabs from other countries does not apply to the Kurds who have 
lived within the confines of the Iraqi state for generations. In fact in 1980 Iraq deponed 80 000 
O h  Bengio. "The Iraqi Kurds: The Struggle for Autonomy in the Shadow 
of the Iran-Iraqi Conflict." vol9. no.3. (November 
1990). pp.258-259. 
'" Khosrowshahi. p. 133. 
'" Khosrowshahi. p. 133. 
Gerard Chaliand.(ed) LS. Vanly. "Kurdistan in Iraq." 
d (Zed Press: London. 1980). p. 174. 
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Kurds on the grounds that wen of Itanh-Kudish origins. lhis policy began in 1971 with the 
expulsion of tens of thousands of Kurds to Iran.*" 
'Ik mi govcnuntnt att~mpts to inacase the Arab population of kaq while decreasing 
Kurdish numbers destroys the e t y  and protection of Kurdish liberty. The policies of 
Ambization and &portation works to the Iraqi govczamtnts advantage and denies the Kurdish 
sector the liberty to liw fraly in their horneland. 
'Lhe -1 policy of educational discrimination and civil sewice employment inequities 
are prevalent and arc the main contributors to the endangerment of the Kurdish culture and 
human rights. Out of 500 high ranldng Ministry of Fomign Affairs offiars only 10 positions 
wen filled by KUI~S.'~' in 1970, Erbil. the richest of the Kurdish provinces had only 70 schools 
per 100 000 people. while Basra, an Arab province in Southan Iraq had 120 schools per 100 
000 people. As well. in 1970 more than 110 schools w a e  closed in the Kurdish pmvina of 
Dahok and in the Kurdish regions of the province of Nineveh. at any rate classcs were taught 
only in Arabic. 
A Kurdish school established in the Kurdish city of Khanaqin. an oil rich aria, lost 400 
students a k r  the administration pnssund and intimidated parents into having their children 
attend Arabic schools.16 This tactic is a form of Ambization, the children speak Kurdish. 
lU Middle East Watch. v. (Yde University Press: New 
Haven, 1990). p.7 1. 
. . t R.D. McLaurin. 
(Pracge: New York. 19'79). pp. 62-63. 
however inevitably Arabic k c o m s  their first language because that is the language that they 
speak, read and write; the Kurdish language becomes secondary. 
The ratio of Kurdish university students to Iraq'~ students is very low, even at the 
university in the Kurdish city of Suleymanieh. which was up until the Gulf War the only 
university in all of ~urdistan.~" In 1972.6.1% of a l l  university students were Kurdish. Only 3 
to 4% of grants went to Kurdish scholars. Kurdish students represented less than 2% of the 
pupils registered at the Iraqi Military Academy, and Police College where army and police 
officers are trained, No Kurdish applicants wen accepted at the Air Force Training School, 
"with good reason seeing as Kurdish villages and towns wen the Iraqi pilots' main targets.la 
Sham elections. superficial appointments of Kurdish government officials, Arabization, 
Kurdish deportations. educational and govemment employment discrimination. are the true 
policies of the Iraqi government. Rather than protected as a national group within the state of 
Iraq, the Kurds are an endangered group. Given the nature of these practices. there is no 
foundation for the protection of Kurdish liberty under the domination of the Iraqi government. 
The Kurds must either assimilate into the Arab culture or be victimized by the Iraqi destruction 
'" Since the Gulf War ended in 199 1, the Kurdish govemment in the safe 
haven area has established new colleges and universities in the KUtdish pmvinces. 
It is worth noting that, prior to the Gulf War. Kurdish Literanut was the only 
subject offered for study in the Kurdish language at the university of Baghdad. In 
the Kurdish University of Salahadien in Mil classes were taught in Arabic, with 
the exception of enginming and medicine which wen taught in English. 
Consquently, students who wished to pursue a higher education were 
"encouraged" by this policy to attend Arabic schools. ?his was not a complete 
necessity due to the fact that the study of the Arabic language is mandatory in all 
schools in Kurdistan of Iraq. 
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of their identity. There arc no alternatives for the Kurds within the state. k order to 
protect their liberty the Kurds must secede from hqm 
I M s  argument is based on biased economic policies of the government in power. Other 
rights need not be violated or denied for this case to legitimize secession. Disctiminatory 
redistribution on its own supports secession." 
Economic discrimination is a pervasive and pernicious element of Iraqi policy towards 
the Kurds. Despite the fact the Kurds are the rightful owners of the rich natural resources 
found in and on their territory, the Iraqis control the wealth accrued from these resources and 
use it to the advantage of the dominant group. 
Many oil fields are located in the Kurdish region of Iraq, yet the Iraqi government 
refuses to distribute a portion of the oil revenues back to the Kurdish region. where it is 
originally found.1s0 In 1961 Kurdish revenues from oil fields in Kurdistan provided with 
53.6% of its total income and 72% if its total imports. In 1975 Ktudistan contributed 75% of 
Iraq's oil production. In the same year the oil profits for Iraqi treasury amounted to $7 178 
billion. Oil refineries, for Kurdish oil, are built in Arab Iraq. "Arab oil for the Arabs," was the 
motto of the Ba'ath Party during the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. It was never mentioned that much 
of that valuable "Arab oil" came from Kurdish soil. 
See pages 11-13 of this thesis and pages 40 to 45 of Buchanan's text for 
more information on escaping discriminatory redistribution. 
Gurr & Harff. p.99. 
Out of 150 Iraqi industrial projects only four were planned for RtUdistan. Steel mills are 
all located in Arab kaq, although iron ore deposits are only locatcd in KPrdistan. Tobacco, an 
important cash crop, is gmwn only in KUfdiStan. Severe nsoictions itre placed on Kurdish 
tobacco i'ea, by the Iraqi government. The government dictates to the farmers how much of 
their land can be used to grow tobacco and then sets the price the farmers can receive for their 
crop. The Kurds smoke only about 15% of the tobacco grown; the rest is consumed by Arabs in 
Iraq, Kuwait and Saudi ~rabia'" 
... Economic development is planned in terms of the enrichment of Arab Iraq, 
especially Baghdad. at the expense of the Kurdish people. The Darband and 
Dokan dams built in the Kurdish territories are mainly used to supply Baghdad 
with electricity. The list of achievements on projects in the 'Autonomous 
Region' is very far from impressive: a couple of cigarette factories at 
Suleyrnanieh and Arbil, a cement factory, a carpet factory, a chicken farm and a 
cattle ranch, a sugar refinery and a marble quarry.'% 
The Kurds contest the Iraqi control of their natural resources. It is this challenge to 
Iraqi authority that provides the basis for the brutal actions of the Iraqi government against the 
Kurds. 
Despite the Kurdish region's abundance of natural resources, such as oil, iron 
on,  and fertile land. the budget allocation for this has traditionally ken  very 
low, ranging from 7 to 12 95 of the total Iraqi budget Until the US -led Gulf 
War in 1991, Kurdish areas had provided much of the raw material for the iron 
and steel industries in Iraq, but these industries have been located elsewhere in 
the country. Tobacco, traditionally a major cash crop in Kurdish regions, has not 
benefitted the Kurds because the government has used its monopoly over the 
tobacco industry to exert economic pressure on the Kurds. AU in all, internal 
colonialism and unequal center-periphery relations have permeated the 
economic dimensions of Kurdish-Arab relations in recent decades.lS 
Is' Chaliand. pp. 160-161. 
'* ChaIiand (ed). Vanly. p.20 1. 
Entessar. p.8. 
The Iraqi govemmmts prognun to forcibly relocate thousands of villagers crushed the Kurdish 
economy? Farmers from the fertile plains of Kurdistan were relocated to cities or worse the 
desert of southern hq-'* 
'Ibe state's legitimacy over the temtory is nullified, in the argumcnt for Esc4ping 
Discriminatory Redistribution. when the state resorts to unjust practices of economic 
redistribution programs. The Iraqi government has used economically discriminatory methods 
to the advantage of the Arab majority while depriving the Kurdish minority of its nahlral 
wealth. At the time of secession the Kurds would benefit only from the nalural resources 
situated in their territory. Iraq would continue on as an economically viable entity proceeding 
to function and prosper in the absence of the newly established Kurdish state. 
A series of criteria must be met by the secessionist group in order to legitimately 
implement this argument. The group must prove that they are an endangered culture. Iraqi state 
policies have not provided adequate measurn to protect the Kurdish culture, rather the 
governments utmost aim has been to destroy the Kurds and their identity. Through repressive 
and brutal actions the Iraqi government operates with the constant objective of oppressing the 
Kurdish people and their culture. 
In Gum & Harff. p.99. 
'" Middle East Watch. -, p.90. 
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In an effort to fully establish the case for cultural endangemeat two Iraqi laws must be 
stated prior to discussing the crimes committed against the Kordish people. According to h q l s  
interim constitution of 1970: 'The people of Iraq is formed of two principal nationalities. the 
Arab nationality and the Kurdish nationality. This constitution shall recognize the national 
rights of the K d i s h  people and the legitimate rights of all minorities within the unity of Iraq." 
As well, Iraq's Law for Autonomy in the Area of Kurdistaa, March 11, 1974: the law of 1974. 
stipulates that "the Kurdish language shall be the official language. besides the Arabic 
language, in the area" and that "Kurdish shall be the language of education for ~ ~ r d s . " ' ~  
Since 1975 and the coilapse of the Kurdish Rebellion. Iraqi attempts to assimilate the 
Kurds and their temtory into Arab control. has taken on a number of different methods. The 
government terminated the Ministry of Northern Affairs and banned the teaching of Kurdish 
history and geography in schools. no mention of these subjects was permitted in text books. In 
school books the proper noun "Kurdistan" was replaced by the phrase "the autonomous region." 
The Kurdish Academy was abolished. Kurdish as the official second language of Iraq was 
eliminated. and the department of Kurdish Studies at Baghdad University was c~osed.'~ 
Ln an effort to reduce Kurdish temtory, the Iiaqi government renamed cities. districts 
and mountains. The Kurdish names of these locations were replaced with Arabic names, such 
as Kirkuk being renamed Al-Ta'mim (nationalization), Rawanduz to Al-Sedeeq (righteous) and 
Haji Ornaran to Al-Nasser (victory). In addition. land from Kurdish provinces was annexed by 
l" Middle East Watch. ibid p.70. 
Is' Khosroshahi. p. 155. 
the Iraqis into Arab pmvinccs." The effect of all these effom is to minimize Kurdish 
influence in the rrgion and gradually absorb all of Kurdistan into the state of Iraq. 
Rior to the Gulf War and the crtation of the Allied safe haven the Iraqi government 
participated in an active relocation program of such magnitude that it threatens the very 
existence of Kurdish identity and culture. The overall goal of this despicable strategy was to 
redraw the map of the Kurdish region in Iraq's favour. In order to accomplish this, Kurds had to 
be removed from their ancestral homeland and relocated to areas under the military control of 
Baghdad. 
The Kurdish relocation program began in 1963 when the Ba'ath party offered incentives 
to Iraqi Arabs to settle on the fringes of Kurdish temtory. More ambitious efforrs at 
Arabization soon followed to areas inhabited by the ~urds.'" The* transfers included over 
Entessar. p.9 
Khosrowshahi. p. 155. 
Middle East Watch. p.86. 
After the collapse of thc 1974-1975 Kurdish uprising, the Iraqi 
government declared an amnesty in which the govemment would consent 
to the safe return otpeshmerga (Kurdish fkeedom fighters) and their 
familes to their homes in the Kurdish region. Once the pesherga and 
their families returned, they wen rounded up by Iraqi soldiers and 
deponed to the south. W deportees were refernd to as "returnees" (al- 
haicdoon) and as such were required to carry identification cards 
indicating that they were returnees, enabling the government to monitor 
their movements. Most of the deportees were allowed to come back to 
Kutdistan after a few years, however they wen  prohibited ftom returning 
to their villages. 
On a personal note these events are not abstract events, my sister and her 
family were deported to the city of Kut (Wassit) in the south of Iraq from 
ErbiI. 
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500.000 Kurds taken from their lands and placed in isolated areas near the Jordanian and Saudi 
borders." 
The Iraqi govemment has created a 30 kilometre wide depopulated strip of land along 
the 1200 kilometre boundaries of Iran and Turkey in 1989. 'Ihe official Iraqi exp1anation for 
this manoeuvre was that it was employed as a protective measure for the Kurds who had 
suffered the trauma of the eight year Iranian aggression and that the Kurds would benefit from 
modernization found in urban areas.I6' 
The mth of this policy is that it was a calculated strategy perpetrated by the Iraqi 
govemment to isolate Kurds in Iraq from Kurds located in neighbouring countries. The move 
worked to effectively cut-off any communication with the peshmerga who operated out of 
remote mountain terrain and the villages in the north. However. the major Iraqi objective was 
to establish three main cities. within the provinces of Erbil. Dahok and Suleimanieh. The Iraqis 
envisioned three large cities with smaller towns scattered around them, which could be easily 
monitored and controlled by Iraqi foms. 
An American Senate staff report provides an illustrative example of the ~ t h k s s  reality 
of the Iraqi depopulation offense. 
mhe Isaqi army has. over the past few months [September 19881. been 
dynamiting the evacuated Kurdish villages. In at least one case the army 
requisitioned earth-moving equipment from a foreign engineering £irm so as to 
eliminate any traces of previous habitation. With hundreds of villages levelled 
the Kurdish countryside has an eery, desencd quality to it. Fruit trees. 
graveyards. and cemeteries stand as reminders of the absent people and 
la Bengio. p.261. 
'" Middle East Watch. w. p.p.87. 
livestock The Iraqi army conducts itself in Kurdistan as if it were a foreign 
occupying army.'e 
The democratic process has begun in Kurdistan. Fra  and just elections for a regional 
parliament were held in Kurdistan in 1992, under the protection of the ally-enforced safe 
haven. 
Unlike in Kuwait, where only a tiny minority of male Kuwaitis may vote, a l l  
men and women over 18 are eligible to vote in the K d s h  election. Jordan had 
parliamentary elections in 1991 but prohibited political parties h m  
campaigning, which the Kurdish parties are doing with gusto. Algeria's military 
stepped in and halted an election when it appeared that Islamic fundamentalists 
might win, but the Islamic Movement of Kurdistan, with its green-and-white 
banners, is ~Dning hard.'" 
The Kurds are in the early stage of establishing a democratic government However, the 
scope of Iraqi repression over the past seventy years has impeded the development of 
democracy in Kurdistan. One cannot expect a western style liberal democratic system to appear 
within a short period of time. It is an evolutionary process. one to which the Kurds are 
committed and struggle to achieve. 
Iraqi assimilation techniques, Arabization policy, depopulation programs and the 
educational inequalities, discussed in Protecting Libem demonstrate that the Kurds are indeed 
an endangered culture. Given the cormpt nature of Iraqi state policy the Kurds have no 
recourse other than to secede From Iraq in order to preserve their cultural identity. Sadly, the 
Kurds fulfil Buchanank criteria for Preserving Culture, only through secession will this culture 
survive the brutalities and injustice infliced upon them by Iraqi totalitarian regimes. 
16' Mid& East Watch. ibid p.88. 
'" Louise Lief. **An Odd Place for Democracy." @. 
vol. 1 12, n0.20. (May 25,1992). p.52. 
Based on Buchanan's Serf-Defense argument a national group has the right to secede in 
order to protect itself h m  e~tennination.'~ Since the creation of the Iraq, Iraqi govenunma 
have systematically denied the Kurds theit rights. From 1958 and the fall of the Iraqi 
monarchy, the five successive governments have used brutal force against the Kurds in order to 
achieve their own ends. Iraqi regimes have committed every kind of oppressive and ruthless act 
known to man. in fact they perpetrated some crimes that had never been committed 
before ..." the Iraqi regime became the fnst in history to attack its own civilian population with 
chemical weapons."'" This crime occurred despite the 1925 Geneva Protocol which prohibits 
the use of chemical weapons. 
The crimes carried out by the Iraqi government against the Kurds are as varied as they 
are barbamus, they include: mass executions and mass disappearances of thousands of Kurdish 
civilians. sometimes the entire population of villages; the use of chemical weapons; rampant 
destruction of Kurdish villages, estimates run between 80 and 8 5 8  of all Kurdish villages have 
been demolished; destruction of Kurdish schools, mosques, wells, churches and other non- 
residential buildings; arbitrary arrests of captured people in "prohibited areas." otherwise 
known as theu homes; illegal jail terms of alleged rebel sympathizers in conditions of extreme 
deprivation. which led to the deaths of hundreds of women, children and elderly Kurds: forced 
displacement of hundnds of thousands of villagers upon destruction of their homes, release 
la Set thesis page 15 and Buchanan's text pp.64-67, for further information on 
Self-Defense. 
'" Middle East Watch. . . . p.9. 
from prison or =turn from exile and the desmction of the Kurdish economy and 
TIE government occasionally refers to the Kurds as partners in the Iraqi state. 
'The Kumls and the Arabs arc brothers, not because we want this today. but because it is a 
historical fan Brotherhood includes rights and status to all the partnef~~"'~ The "shad 
brotherhood" of the Arabs and the K d s  is expounded upon by officers of the Iraqi 
government when it benefits their needs. In truth, there is no shared brotherhood between the 
Kurds and the Arabs, the only thing shared is misery at the hands of the Iraqi govemment. 
Like Nazi Germany. the Iraqi regime concealed its actions in euphemisms. 
Where Nazi officials spoke of "executive measures," "special actions." and 
"nsettlmnt in the east," Ba'athist bureaucrats spoke of *'collective measuns." 
"return to the national ranks" and "resettlement in the south." But beneath the 
euphemisms, Iraq's crimes against the Kurds amount to genocide, the "intent to 
destroy, in whole or in part, a national. ethnical, racial or religious group, as 
such.'" 
Saddarn Hussein's cousin and Iraqi Defense Minister, AIi Hassan al-Majid, described his 
methods for the promotion of relations between the Arabs and the Kurds. "Yes. I'll look after 
[the Kurds]. I'll do it by burying them with bulldozers. That's how I'll do it.'@ With approval 
fkom Baghdad al-Majid orchestrated the chemical weapons attacks and other forms of mass 
Middle East Watch. . . pp.4-5. 
I" Edmund Ghareeb. . 0 . (Syracuse University 
Press: New York. 1981). p.56. 
la Middle East Watch. . . p.5. 
Middle East Watch. 
-. (Human Rights Watch & Physicians for Human Rights: New 
York, 1992). opening page, unnumbered. 
killings. Even today al-Majid is known to the Kurds as "Ali Anfal" and "Ali ~he rn i ca l . "~~  
Based on this common attitude of lraqi govemment officials "it is not surprising that. to many 
Kurds, the Baghdad mgime had lost its mod right to rule them."'" 
One of the most heinous and blatant violations of Kurdish rights was the Iraqi use of 
chemical weapons. In March 1988, the -1 regime used chemical weapons against the town of 
Halabja, killing over 6000 civilians. This outrage is known as the "Kurdish Hiroshima."" The 
Iraqi government's actions of destruction went under the code name ~nfal." The operation 
was carried out in four phases, beginning in February 1988 in the small, remote villages of 
Sergalou and Bergalou, the stronghold of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan. The operation ended 
in September 1988 in the Badinan district, the nerve centre of the Kurdistan Democratic Party. 
This savage and indiscriminate process took the form of air raids, followed by ground assaults 
in which towns, villages and agricultural areas were rnetbodicdy obliterated. As many as 100 
000 Kurds died in the chemical attacks in 1988. 
Their deaths did not come out of the heat of battle - "collateral damage" in the 
military euphemism. Nor were they acts of abberation by individual 
commanders whose excesses passed unnoticed, or unpunished by their superiors. 
Rather, these Kurds were systematically put to death in large numbers on the 
ordm of the central government in Baghdad - days, sometimes weeks, after 
In Middle East Watch. . . p.3. 
17' Michael M. Gunter. "A do facto Kurdish state in Northern Iraq," 
vo1.14, no.2, 1993. p.296. 
ln Bengio. p.262. 
" Anfal is an Arabic word meaning "booty taken from infidels in war." The 
Kurds of Iraq are not "infidels," S i t  the ruling government in Iraq they are Sunni 
Muslim. Ada1 is the title of Surah 8 in the Qut'an. In this context the "Add'" 
campaign symbolized a religiously-sanctioned attack against an alien people. 
being rounded-up in villages marked for destruction or else wide fleeing from 
army assaults in "prohibited ana~."'~' 
Subsequently, secession for the Kurds of hq is the only option they have to protect 
themselves against the genocidal tendencies of the savage Iraqi ngimc. Buchanan states that 
secession for the Kprds based on the argument for SeFDcfene makes for a most compelling 
case. The Kurds of Iraq will face complete eradication. if secession from their oppressor state 
does not become a reality. 
Kurdistan was annexed into the Iraqi state without consent of the Kurdish people. 
Kurdistan was unjustly incorporated into the state of Iraq and therefore secession based on 
Buchanan's argument for Rectifing Past Injustice is morally legitimate. 
When the British created the state of Iraq, it was their policy to balance the Kurdish and 
non-Arab population against the dominant Arab government The Kurds wen the British secret 
weapon that would ensure Arab submission. The threat of Kurdish nationalism, or worse 
independence, would assun acceptance of British imperial policies through out the Middle 
East." 
Prior to the signing of the Treaty of Lausanne. the British and Turks were squabbling 
over the vilayet of Mosul. The British needed Mosul and its oil fields in ordet for Iraq to 
17' Middle East Watch. . . . p.xiv. 
17' Robert Olson. 'The Kurdish question in the aftermath of the Gulf War. 
geopolitical and geostcategic changes in the Middle East" W u  
-. vol. 13, no.3. (1992), p. 476. 
Atarodi. p.276. 
become a viable entity. In order to get Mosul, the British must win over the Kurds, in so doing 
in December 1922. the British and the newly instihlted h q i  govemmtnt drafted a statement 
aclolowledging "the right of the Kurds who live within the frontiers of Itaq to establish a 
Government within those frontiers." Iraq ~ceived its independence in 1930, the British and 
Iraqis faiIed to live up to their a-ment. The Kurds revolted in protest and have been in a 
continuous state of rebellion since 
.. .everything which has been conceded to the Kurds of Iraq has been won by 
force. Autonomy and national rights had been oficially promised by the League 
of Nations as far back as 1925. by the Iraqi government and the Mandate Power 
in 1922. and again in 1925. But the Kurds had to fight for half a Century before 
they gained even a few rights that had been originally recognized as theirs." 
The Sevres Treaty states in Article 64 that Kurds would have an independent state within one 
year of ratScation of the treaty. Turkey's refusal to sign the treaty invalidated its content and 
the treaty has been reduced to no more than historical importance. Therefore, the Kurds have 
no legitimate claim to independence from Iraq. The counter-argument which is equally valid 
claims that if the S e w s  Treaty is. for dl practical purposes, obsolete and imlevant then other 
treaties, such as those instituted by the League of Nations which incorporated Kurdistan into 
Iraq and created the state of Iraq are invalid as well. 
When the allies were expelled from Turkey by Mustufa Kemal, they deserted the 
Kurds. The revised settlement of the Treaty of Lausanne does not even mention 
Middle East Watch. Human in Imq. p.72-73. 
" Chaliand. (ed.), Vanly. p.200. 
On a personal note, when I met this Kurdish author and activist at a conference on 
Kurdish human rights in Washington D.C.in February 1991, he relayed to me the 
incident of an assassination attempt on him, by kaqi "diplomats." Under the 
pretence of bringing him a gift of dates, Mr.Vanly was shot twice in the head by 
one of the "diplomats." as he made coffee for his guests. He spoke to me with in 
very slumd speech, the result of the attack. 
them, Britain used all her diplomatic skill, however, to ensure that the Viayet 
of Mosul. where oil had k e n  discovered was glued on to her artificial new client 
state taq. But if the Treaty of Sems could be torn up after three years, thc 
Treaty of Baghdad on January 1926. which determined the fate of the Mosul 
Kurds without any pretence at consultation. may be consigned to the waste paper 
basket after 65 years.ln 
The division and annexation of Kurdistan was implemented by military fora and in 
contradiction to the wishes of the Kurdish people. Nowhere in civil, criminal or international 
law does it state that stolen property belongs to the thief. Once the stolen property is claimed it 
is returned to the rightful owner. The K d s h  claim to secession is based on illegal tenitorid 
annexation; neither Britain, the original thief and third party to the transaction, nor Iraq, Ihe 
recipient of the hot property, has any valid claim to Kurdish territory. Thus, Kurdish secession 
is legitimate, from the "bastard state of Iraq."179 
'" Lard Avebury. Staff Document, UK Parliamentary Human Rights Group. 
(House of Lords: London. 1991). 
ln Atarodi. p.28 1. 
Chapter 6 
Self-Determination in International Law 
Tht definition of self-determination within the context of international law is 
ambiguous. Many minority groups within sovereign states perceive self-determination as a 
reasonable end to their political struggles. Sovereign states, on the other hand, perceive 
sovereignty as a legitimate principle in the international system. Thus, sovereign states are 
dubious about the principle of se&determination. 
The United Nations recognizes both the principle of self-determination and the 
territorial integrity of sovereign states. The dichotomy of the United Nations stance contributes 
to the tensions between the opposing forces. It is this failure on the part of the United Nations 
to adopt a clear resolution on the self-determination issue that has resulted in world-wide 
conflict between national groups and sovereign states. 
The purpose of this chapter is to examine and analyze the legal theory of self- 
determination within the context of international law. The concept of the self will be addressed 
in order to establish the foundation of the Kurdish claim as a separate and distinct nation. Xn 
defense of the Kurdish claim I will ptesent United Nations Charters, Covenants and Resolutions 
to prove the legitimacy of Kurdish secession From the state of Iraq. 
The origins of selfdetermination has been attributed to a variety of souras. from Greek 
city-states1* to the ~mcrican~'~ and Fnnch ~evolutions~" to Lenidm and Woodrow wilsodu. 
A brief discussion on each derivation follows. 
Greek city-states established laws aad rights comparable to modem laws of M o m  of 
speech, equality before the law and self-respect. Rior to the demise of the ancient Greek 
civilization, international laws had not been developed. however the modem concept of self- 
determination has roots in l e  intranationd legal system of the ~ r e e k s . ' ~  
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Colonial American resentment toward the British, particularly due to taxation without 
representation, manifested itself in the American Revolution and the Declaration of 
Independence, composed by Thomas Jefferson. Jefferson was influenced by the writings of the 
political philosopher John h k e  who espoused the view that just political societies are based 
on consent of the people, who then agree to comply with the maj~rity.'~ Jefferson applied 
Locke's philosophy to the Declaration of Independence which created a foundation for the 
modern concept of self-determination.'" The following excerpt from the Declaration of 
Independence clearly supports the principle of self-determination: 
When in the course of human events, it becomes necessary for one people to 
dissolve the bands which have connected them with another, and to assume 
among the Powers of the earth, the separate and equal station to which the Laws 
of Nature and of Nature's God entitle them, a decent respect to the opinions of 
mankind requires that they should declare the causes which impel them to the 
separation.lg 
The French Revolution proclaimed that govemment should be based on the will of the 
people and that the monarch should not maintain complete control. People dissatisfied with 
their country's government should possess the right of secession in order that they may organize 
themselves in a just and equal manner.Im The principle of the Divine Right of Kings was 
replaced by the Divine Right of the People. 
" Wiam F. Grover & Joseph G. Peschek. (Harper 
Collins College Publishers: New York, 1993). p.285. 
The revolutionary theory that a people had the right to form its o m  constitution 
and choose its own government for itseIfcasily passed into the claim that it had 
the right to decide whether to attach itself to one state or another, or constitute 
an independent state by itse If.... me logical consequence of democratization of 
the idea of thc state by the revolutionaries was the theory of national self- 
determination. '- 
The Soviet leaders of the October 1917 Revolution acquired a muhinational empire, as 
a consequence the Bolsheviks took the issue of self-determination seriously. Lenin introduced 
the principle of national sewdetermination into Bolshevik political policy and since that time 
self-determination has taken a permanent place in Soviet political ideology."' 
LRnin believed that Marxism couId not avoid the issue of self-determination and that the 
over-riding objective of every national movement is to work toward thc establishment of a 
national state. Lenin clearly states the Soviet attitude on self-determination when he states: 
Consequently. if we want to learn the meaning of self-detem6nation of nations 
not by juggling with legal defmitions, or "inventing" abstract definitions, but by 
examining the historical and economic conditions of the national movements. 
we shall inevitably reach the conclusion that self-determination of nations means 
the political separation of these nations from alien bodies, the formation of an 
independent national state." 
Woodrow Wilson's vision of selfdetermination, in spite of his much lauded Fourteen 
Points and Four Principles, was a response to the Bolshevik agenda and the pragmatics of post- 
World War One demands. 
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19' Alexander & Friedlander. p. 134. 
" Lenin. p. 11. 
19' Pomerance. p.2. 
President Wilson defended the right of peoples to selfdetermination. in a familiar quote 
he indicates that "every people has a right to choose the sovereignty under which they shall 
live." Furthennore. he states in MI of his Fourteen Points: 
The Turkish portions of the present Ottoman Empirc should be assurcd a secure 
sovereignty, but the other nationalities which are now under Turkish rule should 
be assund undoubted security of life and an absolutely unmolested opportunity 
of autonomous developmen~lW 
The evolution of the concept of sesdetemrination over the millennia has encompassed 
a progression fnrm the most rudimentary rights of the people within a state to advancement for 
peoples in the international realm. The principles of ~e~determination remain open for 
interpretation between groups striving for rights and groups who aim to maintain the sovereign 
state status quo. 
?he League of Nations does not specifically mention self-determination, however, 
related aspects are discussed.'9s The sacred trust of civilizations ensured that "peoples not yet 
able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modem world would be held 
in a sacred trust to protect their well-being and de~elopment.~~ TheLeague did recognize an 
accountability and responsibility for the treatment of people no matter where they were located. 
Some features of the League of Nations Covenants still retain their historical importance today. 
The decisions made by the League of Nations still affects same minority groups who struggle 
Umozurike. p.19. 
19' Falkowski. p.220. 
'% Wilson. p.57. 
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for seE-dctcRnination. Armenia and KurdiPtan were to k placed under the mandate system, 
however neither of these mandates w a e  instituted and both nations w a e  forgotten1" It 
appears that the League of Nations approach to selfdetermination was based upon the p ~ c i p l e  
of reward and punishment The Allies rewanled faithful war time supporters such as the Poles. 
Czechoslovaks .ad Yugoslavs by granting them independence. Opponents of the Allies, such as 
the Turks and the Germans were punished by boundary revisions according to the aims of the 
Allied powerdm Only the states defeated by the AUics were charged with subjugation of their 
peoples and the application of self-determination never detrimentally affccted the ~llies.'~' 
The right of peoples to self-determination has a prominent place in United Nations 
Charters and Resolutions. No mention was made of ~e~determination i  UN Charters and 
Covenants prior to the Assembly's acceptance of the Soviet Union's amendment proposalam for 
Chaptex I (2) and Chapter 1x0, which later became Article I(2) and Article 55. The Soviet 
amendment was composed of the phrase "based on respect for the principle of qua1 rights and 
self-determination of  people^."^' 
'" S d a .  p.96. 
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One of the United Nations four objectives is established in Article I(2): "To develop 
friendly relations among nations based on respect for the p ~ c i p l e  of equal rights and seS 
determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal 
peace."" Article 55 (c) states that the purpose of the United Nations shall m a t e  "universal 
respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental fntdoms for aLI without 
distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion."'03 
On the recommendation of the Commission on Human Rights in 1952 the Assembly 
accepted Resolution 5 4 5 0 ,  
... to include in the International Covenant or Covenants on Human Rights an 
article on the right of al l  peoples and nations to self-determination in 
reaffirmation of the principle enunciated in the C h a r  of the Unkd Nations. 
This article shall be drafted in the following terms: 'All peoples shall have the 
right of selfaetermination', and shall stipulate that States, including those 
having responsibility for the adminstration of Non-Self-Governing Territories 
should promote the realization of that righ t..." 
In 1967 Resolution 2160- prohibited the threat or use of force against groups 
see king self-determination. 
Any forcible action, direct or indirect, which deprives peoples under foreign 
domination of their right to self-determination and freedom and independence 
and of their right to determine freely their political status and peruse their 
economic, social and cultural development constitutes a violation of the Charter 
of the United Nations. Accordingly, the use of force to deprive peoples of their 
naaual identity as prohibited by the Declaration on the Inadmissibility of 
Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States and the Protection of Their 
" A. LeRoy Bennett.  0 .  . . 
(Prentice Hall: Englewood, 1988), p.456. 
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Independence and Sovenignty contained in General Assembly Resolution 
2131(XX), constitutes a violatioa of their inalienable rights and the principles of 
nonintervention.- 
In 1965 the UN Assembly accepted the Declaration on the Iiradmissibiity of Intervention in 
Domestic Aff" and bttct ion of Their Independence and Sovereignty: 
All States shall respect the rights of ~e~detennination a d indepcn&na of 
peoples and nations, to be fnely exercised without any fomign pressure, and 
with absolute respect for, human rights and fundamental fnedoms. 
Consequently all states shall contribute to the complete elimination of racial 
discrimination and colonialism in all its forms and manifestations? 
The Declaration on Colonialism drafted by the Afro-Asian States was approved in 1960 
and became Resolution IS 1 4 0 .  This Resolution greatly enhanced the acceptance of self- 
determination as a legal right 
1. The subjection of peoples to alien subjugation. domination and exploitation 
constitutes a denial of fundamental human rights, is con- to the Charter of 
the United Nations and is an impediment to the promotion of world peace and 
cooperation. 
2. AU peoples have the right to stlf-determination; by virtue of that right they 
freely determine their political status and fnely determine their economic. 
social. and cultwal development 
3. Inadequacy of political, economic, social or educational preparedness should 
never serve as a pretext for delaying independence. 
4. All armed action or repressive measures of all kinds directed against 
dependent peoples shall cease in order to enable them to exercise peacefuUy and 
k l y  their right to complete independence and the integrity of their national 
temtory shall be respected. 
Djonovich. "Resolution 2160(lW),30 November 1966," 
-. series I. vol.XI, 1966-1968, (Oceana Publications: New Y0*,1975), 
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7. All statcs shall obsem faithfbuy and strictly the provisions of the Charter of 
the Unitcd Nations, the Universal kclaration of Human Rights and the present 
Declaration on the basis of equality, non-intederence in the internal affairs of all 
states and rrspect for the sovereign rights of all peoples and their temtorial 
integrity.= 
The conapt of self-determination has evolved, mainly over the last Hty years, from an 
idea, to a principle. to a right, to a recognized international law. The events that influenced the 
progression were not specXcally revolutionary. instead the metamorphosis is a result of 
changes in the world order. In spite of the confusion over the ambiguous phraseology in 
international law. a general consensus has been reached globally agreeing that people do have 
the right to self-determination. 
The scholarly controversy over which groups are eligible for self-determination prevails 
amongst writers and academics. Many scholars believe that the people. the "self," should be 
defined prior to any rights being awarded. Ivor Jennings oft-quoted statement supplies an 
illustrative example regarding the lack of scholarly consensus on who receives rights of self- 
determination. He states "On the surface it seems reasonable; let the people decide. It [is] in 
fact ridiculous because the people cannot decide until somebody decides who are the p e ~ p l e . " ~  
Therefore it seems that not only can academics not agree on who deserves rights of self- 
determination. they cannot determine who is the self. 
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The political thought relaled to self-determination is greatly conflictive. Rupert 
Emrnerson believes that 
What emerges beyond dispute is that aIl peopks do nut have the right of self- 
determination: they never had it and they never will have it. The changing 
content of n a W  law in the era of decolooization has brought no change in this 
basic proposition? 
Rosalyn Higgins acknowledges that the argument over which groups are desewing of 
self-determination has not been adequately resolved. She asserts ..." that selfkietexmination has 
developed into an international legal right, and is not an essentially domestic matter. The extent 
and scope of the right is still open to some 
Other scholars question the legitimacy of what criteria defines a people. Margaret 
Moore claims that "One of the most serious objections raised to the principle of national self- 
determination is that the concept, in itself, does not tell us who the peoples are that are entitled 
to self-determination or the jurisdictional unit they are entitled to.""' Moon contends that the 
problem is a rtsult of the imposition of objective standards that the groups seeking self- 
determination must meet in order to be considered a nation."' 
aos Rupert Emmerson. . . . .  . 
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Y o m  Dinstein suppons Moore's contention that objective criteria may not present the 
best or only mwprr for deciding which peoples constitute a nation* In his essay on self- 
deednation Dinst& contends that 
Peoplehood must be s a n  as contingent on two separate elements. one objective 
and& other subjective. The objsctive element is that there has to exist an 
ethnic group linked by common his-. The strength of the ethnic-historical 
link is admittedly a matter of contention .... there is also a subjective basis of 
peoplehood.... It is essential to have a pEsent ethos or state of mind A pcoplt is 
both entitled and required to identify itself as such.. . Thut is no place for a 
Diktat from outside in this nspecr one people cannot decree that another group 
is not entitled to peopleho~d."~ 
A people in R.S. Bhalla's view is loosely based on an objective norm. The foundation of 
peoplehood rests on a collective consciousness in which the group involved share an identity. 
culture and history. It is the essence of peoplehood that the group possess a desire to continue 
and perpetuate these bonds. These are the elements. according to Bhalla, that constitute a 
BhaIla's interpretation of a people is similar to the United Nations Report which defines 
indigenous people as follows 
...p eoples and nations are those which, having a historical continuity with pn- 
invasion and pn-colonial societies that developed on their temtories. consider 
themselves distinct from other sectors of the societies not prevailing in these 
territories or parts of thcrn...arc determined to pmsuve. develop and transmit to 
fume generations their ancestral territories and their ethnic identity. as the basis 
of their continued existence as peoples, in accordance with their own cu1tural 
patterns, social institutions and legal systems.21s 
""kxander & Friedlander (eds.) Yoram Dinstein. 246-247. 
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Daniel Phifpott maintains that a subjective criteria is most suitable m define a people. 
He states that c h ~ t c r i s t i c s  allocated by external sources to pigeonhole who is a people and 
who is not art imlevant. He believes that.."it simply does not matter which traits define a 
seceding group; we know one when it announces, campaigns. or takes up arms for its dream of 
seu-det~rmination."~'~ Philpott contends that the historical origins of a p u p  is not a 
consideration for establishing the merit of selfdetenninatioo, rather this scholarly endeavour is 
best left to academics who are experts in this area. 
Certainly every group that has ever fought for independence or autonomy has 
shared some trait, usually ethnicity. It is typically a "nation" - that is, a group of 
people, united by a cultural characteristic - that conceives of itself as a "nation" 
(the definition is subjective), and aspires to political autonomy. My point is only 
that neither ethnicity nor any other objective oalt should be the criterion of 
identification."' 
The controversy over who constitutes a people and merits the rights of self- 
determination continues. It is commonly accepted today that people who struggle for self- 
determination are defined as a people by their struggle. External definitions are superfluous. In 
some cases external definitions are a deliberate attempt to deny a groups rights to self- 
determination. External definitions, generally, do not work to assist groups in their cause, rather 
they work to maintain the status quo. 
'I6 Daniel Philpott. "In Defense of Self-Determination." -. (University of 
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International laws indicate that the Kurds of Iraq possess a clear right, not only to self- 
determination, but to independent stat~hood. According to the United Nations Report on 
d e f i g  indigenous people~18 the Kurds met a l l  the criteria to define them as a nation. They 
possess a temtory on which a historical p n t o l o ~ s e d  society flourished. The Kurds definiteiy 
consider themselves to be non-Arabs. Despite Iraqi occupation the Kurds have maintained their 
ethnic identity and wish to live celebrating their own "culNal patterns. social institutions and 
legal systems." 
The Kurds have survived as an intact people for thousands of years. unquestionably the 
Kurds want future generations to know what it is to be a Kurd. There is no valid dispute; the 
Kurds are united by temtory. history and culture. 
Whether a objective definition or subjective definition is implemented, the Kurds are a 
people. The Iraqi government bears this out most compellingly. The Iraqi strategy of 
destruction perpetrated against the Kurds proves that this alien people is a thorn in the side of 
the dominant power group. In order to seize Kurdish territory then are no lengths to which 
Baghdad would not go to eliminate the Kurds. 
At no time in history did the Kurds consent to the incorporation of Kurdistan into Iraq. 
The Kurds wen not allowed to =present their own interests at the talks of the Treaty of 
Lausanne, the two great champions of the Kurds, the Turks and the British spoke on their 
behalf. Essentially the Kurds have been held hostage, fmt by the British and then the Iraqis for 
the last seventy years. 
2'8 See page 83 of this thesis for UN Report defmition on indigenous people. 
Governments are onLy legitimate when the people consent to their power. The Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights "ncognizes that the consent of the governed forms the basis of aU 
just govemmcnt"219 This means "that the ppwle zeselve the inalienable right to alter or abolish 
any government that does not rrcognizc this right ...."" Tyrannical Iraqi governments have 
ruled the Kurds with an iron fist, without respect for any sort of human rights; therefore the 
only realistic way for the Kurds to implement their "inalienable right to alter or abolish" unjust 
governments, given the nature of the Iraqi government oppression, is to secede out of the kaqi 
reign of tenor. 
Secession has been largely overlooked in international law. U 'lhant stated that 
the United Nations "has never accepted and does not accept and I do not believe 
it will ever accept the principle of secession of a part of its Member State." 
Similarly, leaders of newly independent states have consistently taken the 
positionthat the right of selfdekrmination does not include the right of 
seces~ion.~' 
A quanu of a century after U Thants' vituperation, a series of secessions have occurred 
through out the world. New and different ideas on secession are emerging in contemporary 
political thought. New philosophies challenge U Thants' anti-secessionist pronouncement, as 
well the UN bias toward sovereign states. 
... nations should be fke,  i t .  not oppressed by other nations, empires of polities; 
and, conversely, that nations should not oppress other nations or establish 
empires. It docs not require aIl nations to seek independent statehood, but it 
does require that members of the nation must consent to the form of government 
under which they live and express themselves, because without such consent 
'" Falkowski. p.228. 
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they would not be fne. Fmdy, it requires nations to have the presumptive right 
of secession from existing states.... 222 
The argument that secession should become an openly acknowledged right and not the 
current cloud of confusion is taken a step further by Heraclides who contends that under the 
UN Friendly Relations Declaration of 1970. assessments for secession can be made on the basis 
of discrimination. "By following such a line we will also be tapping the realities of the 
separatist process .... tr223 
There are inequities within the principles of the United Nations regarding self- 
determination. Based on Resolution 15 14. people who are under alien subjugation are entitled 
to self-determination. The Kurds perceive themselves as alien as to Iraqis. yet this alienation is 
ignored by the United Nations, therefore the resolution is not implemented in the case of the 
Kurds. 
Why, for example. should a mujorio suffering racist discrimination (blacks in 
South Afkica under apartheid) be entitled to self-determination but not minorin'es 
in a state who are suEfering under racist or discriminatory policies (a much more 
common phenomenon)? And why are Palestinians the only people living under 
"alien" rule when there are many national groups which perceives the state as 
alien to them and hostile to their national identity?= 
The inequality in application of these principles is clearly evident There seems to be no valid 
or just reason for the United Nations to disregard the Kurdish claim to self-determination. 
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indeed to secession, based in their own principles and the precedent set by the validation of 
Palestinian self-detennination. 
Colonialism has been popular1y viewed as the only basis for self-determination. It can 
be persuasively argued that this Line of thought is not keeping up with the temtorial changes in 
the world. Yugoslavia and Soviet U n h  provide forceful examples of why this thought is 
rapidly becoming out-datcd and seriously detrimental to the lives of millions of people through 
out the world. This colonial principle, which has been the core of UN objections to secession, is 
outdated because nations are slowly beginning to form independent states regardless of UN 
principles. It is destructive because civil war and armed struggle may be the only option for 
oppressed people who must fight for their rights, due to the lack of any kind of consistent 
employment of UN principles stipulating the right to self-determination. 
International law still manages to convey the impression that the right of 
secession in pursuit of national self-determination is confmed to peoples 
separated from their rulers' homeland by saltwater, or to people differentiated 
fmm their rulers by pigmentation. It sees a distinction between the historical 
subjugation of an alien population living in a different pan of the globe and the 
historical subjugation of an alien population living on a piece of land abutting 
that of its oppressors." 
Recent territorial changes and the emergence of new states indicate that the colonial 
ruler argument for self-determination is growing we*, however it still prevails. Not only 
people under colonial rule, but people subjected to alien rule and discrimination are equally 
entitled to self-de~nnination. whatever course that may take, under the principles of United 
Nations. ?he Kurds an, as has been discussed, ruled by an discriminatory, alien state. They are 
the victims of internal colonialism and as such have the right to secede. 
It might be politically comct to d e d k  only western powers contn,lIing 
overseas territories as imperialists, but it is not factwlly conect: the term 
"imperialism" can be coherently and persuasively applied to any attempt by one 
people to dominate politically another people, especially if the later perceives 
the rule be hostile to their national identity.= 
Tht United Nations may not advocate secession. however there can be w question that 
the UN docs not support human rights violations or genocide either. If sovereign states violate 
internationally agreed upon principles for just and fair treatment of minority groups within their 
borders. it naturally follows that minorities will reject the legitimacy of the sovereign state as 
their rulers. The denial of self-determination leads to genocide. Governments of sovereign 
states are free to conduct the affairs of the state any way that they choose, participating in gross 
human rights violations without concern of any reprisal from international bodies. True, there 
are laws prohibiting human rights abuses. it is also true that these laws are not enforced in any 
kind of meaningful way. 
The blatant human rights violations enacted by the Iraqi government against the Kurds 
are overlooked by the United Nations. Only through legitimate secession recognized by the UN 
will the Kurds survive as an intact nation. 
If it was imperative that Kuwait should be freed from alien mititary occupation, 
is it not also important to put an end to the unwilling subjection of such other 
peoples as the Palestinians, the Kurds, the East Tirnorese, and the 
n t l e t a r l ~ ? ~  
The Kurds under international law have the right to secede from the totalitarian state of 
Iraq. Claims that secession would destabilize the world order can be refuted by claims that 
IP6 Moore. p.4. 
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peace would be encouraged by the laws and principles alnady on the books if they were 
enforced to protect the rights of all people. 
A long list of other peoples are demanding a right to ~e~dttennination. Rather 
than lump all terrorist activities and liberation struggles together, the validity of 
such claims could be determined by holding plebiscites. ?he legitimacy of a 
claim to ~e~determination ught to be based upon the will of the people and not 
the xniIitary power of a state to preserve itself. Self-determination is a 
revolutionary principle. It states that all just government is based on the consent 
of the governed. and not on the power of a new incarnation of self- 
determination, the failure of the United Nations to truly universalize the 
principle can be viswed as one of its greatest failures in promoting human rights. 
If the United Nations will not learn from the lessons of history, perhaps the next 
world organization will? 
The obligation is on the United Nations to live up to its laws and ensure that all people 
have the right to self-determination, as stipulated in Articles l(2) and 55 of its charter. To end 
the atrocities committed against the Kurds, a genuine self-determination will enable them to 
control their territory, natural resources, fxedoms and political rights. At present the UN is 
biased toward the sovereign state. It is at least unethical to favour sovereign states when the 
result is the demise of an entire people. Given the nature of Iraqi policies the Kurds have a 
legitimate right reject the Iraqi govemment and form their own independent state. 
Conclusion 
This thesis has ken based on a central theme - secession of Kwdistan fiom the state of 
Iraq. Research has been conducted on two specific areas: moral theories of secession and 
international laws and principles on self'-detcnnination. In order to substantially examine these 
principles, an effort was made to analyze and apply the literature to the Kurdish claim for 
independent statehood. 
Thc fmt principle discussed is the moral theory of justice based on Buchanans' 
argument for secession. Buchanan acknowledges the lack of a uniMrsally accepted theory of 
secession: to assist in filling the void Buchanan establishes a theory for secession based on 
moral principles. Five of Buchanan's arguments were analyzed to demonstrate that the Kurds 
possess a legitimate moral claim. In each argument considerable evidence is offered to make 
the Kurdish secessionist claim more solid and compelling. The application of Buchanan's 
arguments consistently prove in each case that the Kurds possess a moral right to secede from 
Iraq, 
Brilmayer's interpretation of secession based on territorial claims is applied to the 
Kurdish situation. Brilmayer maintains that secession must be based on a tenitorid dispute. 
rather than an active conflict over the rights of a people. The violation of rights and a valid 
territorial claim work together to legitimize secessionist claims. 'k evidence gained by 
applying her principles to the historical perspective of the Kurds establishes a legitimate case 
for Kurdish secession based on historical grievance. 
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The second thcmc pnsentd focuses on international law and the p ~ c i p l e r  of self- 
&termination. In spite of the bias of international law against secessionist movcmcnts 
numemus secessions have occumd. The Kurds like many othct miwrities have ken ignored 
by international lawmaking bodies. The anti-secessionist bias should in ao way detract from 
the Kurdish clrim to self-determination. The evidcna provided in the discussion on 
international law and the Kurdish quest for an independent state overwhelmingly concludes that 
neglect and the reticence on the part of international bodies maintains the sovereign state status 
quo at the expense of the Kurds, a price paid in human life. 
In an effort to demonstrate that the Kurds arc a distinct nation occupying their own 
territory, Kurdish origins and the historical perspective was addrrssed These aspects of the 
thesis prove that the Kurds axe subjugated and that external powers such as thc Iraqi state and 
colonial powers are the villains. The Kurds break no laws. they merely seek to  claim their 
temtory and to choose their destiny by their own fhc will. 
Iraqi state policies implemented against the Kurds arc obvious violations of human 
rights. Given the nature of such c h e s .  not only moral theory, but legal principles as well 
support the Kurdish claim to genuine self-determination. The Kurds nlentlessly struggle for 
independent statehood. without support from the champions of democracy and frredom. 
International laws invoked a protect the rights of seU-determination are unenforced. Sovereign 
states have b e  rein in the maltreatment of their minority groups. Yet, the Kurds determinedly 
fight for independence. The burden lies on the United Nations to adhere m their principles; 
groups like the Kurds can neither be wished away nor crushed into non-existence. 
Iraqi Kurdistan 
Map 1. Gerard Chaliand. A People Without a Country: The Kurds and Kurdistan. 
(New York: Olive Branch Press, 1993), p .  141.  
Map 2. David McDowell. A Modem History of the  Kurds. (New York: I . B .  Tauris, 
1996), Map 2. 
Map 3 .  Mustafa Al-Karadaghi. Kurdistan Times. vol .  1, no. 2 (1992), p a  90. 
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